Taking Back the Streets? How Street Art Ordinances Constitute Government Takings by Evans, Sheldon
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications 
2015 
Taking Back the Streets? How Street Art Ordinances Constitute 
Government Takings 
Sheldon Evans 
St. John's University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
  
685
Taking Back the Streets? How Street Art 
Ordinances Constitute Government 
Takings 
Sheldon A. Evans* 
As street art continues to fuel a generation of counterculture and 
gains popularity in pop culture, laws enacted by local governments to 
curb this art form raise interesting constitutional issues surrounding the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. More and more cities across Amer-
ica are classifying street art and graffiti as public nuisances. Such mu-
nicipalities impose their agenda on private property owners with street 
art ordinances. These laws allow the government to come onto private 
property to remove the street art; some laws go even further by requiring 
the property owner to remove the street art at his own cost. This Article 
attempts to make sense of the Takings Clause’s tumultuous doctrines 
and their underlying principles in order to analyze this anti-street art 
campaign. In the process, this Article analyzes whether street art ordi-
nances constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment due to their poten-
tial negative economic impact on property values and the temporary dep-
rivation of essential property rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a property owner, discovering graffiti on your property can 
be like discovering a latent liability or striking oil. Without your 
consent, some member of the counterculture has used your pristine 
building, wall, or other surface as a canvas to forward their artistic 
agenda. To add insult to injury, they have left you to clean up the 
mess. Further, the city in which you live has specific laws that re-
quire the following: either you paint over the graffiti at your own 
cost or give consent to city workers to do the same. As a property 
owner with legitimate interests in your property value, removal of 
such blight in the usual case could not come sooner. But what if 
this graffiti was more than the product of rival gangs marking their 
territory; what if it was more than artistic teenagers seeking a thrill; 
what if it was more than underground artists trying to make a name 
for themselves? What if, instead, it was the stencil of an unassum-
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ing rat,1 of two lovers,2 or even a girl on a swing?3 In that case, as 
this Article endeavors to demonstrate, everything changes due to 
the constitutional calculus and the economic rights of the property 
owner. 
Street art, as such public displays of uncommissioned art are 
commonly referred to, is becoming more of a common social phe-
nomena in urban centers. This is so much the case that many 
American cities have gone to extreme lengths to adopt strict laws 
and penalties to curb street artists. Such laws, however, not only 
seek to punish the artist but also the owner of the canvas; these 
street art ordinances impose stiff penalties on property owners who 
do not take appropriate steps to remove street art from their prop-
erty. These laws affect property owners’ rights to exclude others 
from the property, to benefit from improvements to their property, 
and to manage and enjoy their property as they see fit. The loss of 
such important property rights elicits interesting constitutional is-
sues under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.4 After all, pri-
vate ownership of property (and the rights that accompany such 
ownership) has been described from the beginning of the Union as 
among the most important and fundamental virtues necessary to 
build a free society.5 Further, in a day and age when street art is 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Deborah Vankin, Banksy’s Haight Street Rat Scampers Down to U.S. Bank Tower 
in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/
arts/culture/la-et-cm-banksy-haight-street-rat-us-bank-tower-los-angeles-20140924-
story.html (highlighting Banksy’s rat stencil in Los Angeles). 
2 See Banksy Artwork Saves Youth Club as it Sells for £400k, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 27, 
2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/11059481/Banksy-artwork-
saves-youth-club-as-it-sells-for-400k.html (highlighting Banksy stencil “Mobile 
Lovers”). 
3 See Andrian Glick Kudler, Some LA Street Art Worth $650K, Some Worth Felony 
Charges, CURBED LOS ANGELES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://la.curbed.com/archives/
2014/04/in_los_angeles_some_street_art_is_worth_650k_and_some_is_worth_felon
y_charges.php (highlighting Banksy stencil of a girl on a swing in a Los Angeles parking 
lot). 
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5 See James W. Ely, Jr., “That due satisfaction may be made:” the Fifth Amendment and 
the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1 (1992) (“[T]he notion 
that property ownership was essential for the enjoyment of liberty has long been a 
fundamental tenet of Anglo-American constitutional thought.” (citing JOHN PHILLIP 
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF 
RIGHTS 27–33 (1986))); see also Cameron Madigan, Taking for Any Purpose?, 9 HASTINGS 
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enjoying immense popularity as an art form, the imposition of the 
state upon a property owner to remove street art can actually dam-
age the value of his property. 
This Article argues that such street art ordinances—without 
built-in judicial oversight or proper means of administrative chal-
lenges—should constitute a government taking pursuant to the 
Takings Clause. This Article forwards its argument in six parts. 
Part I introduces street art, its definition, and its culture. Upon in-
vestigation, it becomes apparent that this art form has gained trac-
tion in popular culture, which has created a market demand that 
can benefit property owners. Part II lays out the conflicting ideolo-
gy of the rule of law in many major metropolitan areas, with a par-
ticular focus on Los Angeles’s anti-graffiti scheme. Many city gov-
ernments across the United States continue to classify street art as 
a public nuisance that harms the community. After these ordinanc-
es are introduced, Part III continues by outlining the constitutional 
backdrop. Making sense of this body of law is no small feat, and this 
Article attempts to clarify conflicting doctrines by analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s underlying principles in applying the Takings 
Clause. Next, Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of street art 
ordinances and whether the forced removal of potentially valuable 
street art is an unconstitutional taking. Ultimately, this Article ar-
gues that street art ordinances can constitute unconstitutional tak-
ings, and proposes solutions to remedy this problem. This Article 
concludes with a brief summary of unconstitutional street art ordi-
nances and the hope that legal scholarship will further explore this 
issue. 
I. THE STREET ART MOVEMENT — A COUNTER CULTURE 
If art is to nourish the roots of our culture, society must 
set the artist free to follow his vision wherever it takes 
him. 
-John Fitzgerald Kennedy6 
                                                                                                                            
W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179 (2002–2003) (quoting John Adams: “Property must be 
secured or liberty cannot exist.” (citation omitted)). 
6 SIMON G. ANRINK, JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENCY 105 (1987). 
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Philosophers have recognized the social impact of visual art for 
centuries.7 Visual art shapes a new reality derived from the artist’s 
perceptions, communicating to audiences through expressive func-
tions and symbols.8 In this way, art as a method of communication 
is somewhat innate and dates back to the beginning of humanity.9 
One could even say that street art was the first art form; for over 
30,000 years, the human race has used walls of buildings, homes, 
caves, trees, and other mediums to communicate stories.10 This is 
no surprise considering that the English word “graffiti” is derived 
from the Italian word “graffiare,” meaning “‘to scratch,’ which 
refers to the earliest forms of graffiti etched into walls and trees.”11 
In order to further explore this topic in the present day, it is 
important to discern what the term “street art” means in culture, 
and also in the context of this Article. It  can mean many different 
                                                                                                                            
7 Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and the Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the 
Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 224 n.12 (1987) (citation 
omitted) (“Plato, for example, considered artists so powerful and influential that they 
were to be outlawed in his ideal Republic unless they served the state. His concern was 
their corrupting influence.”). 
8 See id. at 223 (citing H. READ, ICON AND IDEA 105 (1955); H. READ, ART AND 
ALIENATION 162–64 (1967)). 
9 John McMillen & Rebecca Atkinson, Artists and Athletes: Balancing the First 
Amendment and the Right of Publicity in Sport Celebrity Portraits, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS 
SPORT 117, 118 (2004) (“Individual interpretive expression dates back to the beginning of 
human civilization to the Paleolithic, Mesolithic, and Neolithic time periods and has 
appeared in every culture since.” (citing E.H. GOMBRICH, THE STORY OF ART 39–43 
(16th ed. 1995))). 
10 Christian Ehret, Mural Rights: Establishing Standing for Communities Under American 
Moral Rights Laws, 10 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010) (“The origins of mural art have 
been traced back more than 30,000 years, evidenced by prehistoric images of animals 
found painted on the walls of the Chauvet Cave in Southern France. Throughout history, 
murals have been employed by man to tell stories and to convey artistic expression. The 
Ajanta Caves in Maharashtra, India, date back to the third century B.C. and contain 
intricate mural art depicting the Jataka stories. The San Bartolo murals in Guatemala 
were created in the first century B.C. and represent an important part of Mayan 
history.”). 
11 Sarah Stephens, Fun with Vandalism: The Illegal Street Art of Shepard Fairey and 
Banksy 9 (2014) (published M.A. thesis, University of Cincinnati), available at 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION_NUM:ucin1148076772#ex
port-ris); see also SCAPE MARTINEZ, GRAFF: THE ART & TECHNIQUE OF GRAFFITI 8 
(2009); CARLO MCCORMICK, The Writing on the Wall, in ART IN THE STREETS 20 (Jeffrey 
Deitch et al., eds., 2011). Under this definition, graffiti cannot be a moral wrong because 
even God has participated in graffiti etching the Decalogue out of stone and writing the 
eerie prophecy on the wall of King Belshazzar’s demise. 
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things to different people with different interests. The term is con-
nected to the negative connotation that “graffiti” earned in socie-
ty, where graffiti was commonly associated with gang tagging that 
marked territory.12 Thus, even though many street artists use graf-
fiti to paint their art, they would scoff at being lumped together 
with those who use graffiti to scribble gang signs and affiliations.13 
Nevertheless, exploring such debate is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle;14 instead, the term “street art” will refer to any uncommis-
sioned artwork, mural, or artistic writing, excluding gang tagging. 
The term includes artwork done using paint, graffiti, markers, 
stencils, stickers, tiles, adhesive, or other writing methods, all 
without the prior permission of the property owner.15 
                                                                                                                            
12 Margaret L. Mettler, Comment, Graffiti Museum: A First Amendment Argument for 
Protecting Uncommissioned Art on Private Property, 111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 254 (2012) 
(citing CEDAR LEWISOHN, STREET ART: THE GRAFFITI REVOLUTION 18 (2008) (“One of 
the principle [sic] reasons for making a distinction between street art and graffiti writing is 
that graffiti has such a bad public reputation.”)). 
13 LEWISOHN, supra note 12, at 31 (“Tagging was invented in the mid-1960s . . . . [The 
graffiti before 1965] had largely been gang-related and ha[d] its own history and 
traditions . . . . [Gang graffiti] is separate from graffiti writing. After around 1970, we can 
clearly start to identify people doing graffiti writing as opposed to gang graffiti.”); Melissa 
L. Hughes, Street Art & Graffiti Art: Developing an Understanding 5–11 (2009) 
(published M.A. Ed. thesis, Georgia State University), available at 
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/art_design_theses/50/ (exploring definitional differences 
between the terms “street art” and “graffiti art”); Michelle Bougdanos, The Visual 
Rights Act and Its Application to Graffiti Murals: Whose Wall is it Anyway?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 549, 558 (2002) (“Significantly, graffiti is no longer relegated to the streets. 
It appears in museums, art exhibitions, and in galleries. Graffiti is not just the scrawling of 
gang members but encompasses murals, fashion and has been the subject of several 
films.” (footnotes omitted)); Deborah Laverty, Graffiti Art Preserves Jackson Legacy, NWI 
TIMES (June 4, 2011, 7:50 PM), available at http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/
lake/gary/article_4cbcfa91-0037-5e5a-88fd-eceaae228324.html (quoting street artist 
Gerry Guevara as saying “[s]ome people confuse graffiti with gangs, but this is entirely 
different. We’re not claiming territory.”). 
14 See Mettler, supra note 12, at 254 n.36 (“Much scholarly literature is devoted to 
defining and distinguishing these categories.” (citing Marisa A. Gomez, Comment, The 
Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions Through Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti 
Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 644–51 (1993); Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They 
Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be Able or Caned?: A Look at the Latest Legislative 
Attempts to Eradicate Graffiti, 6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 225, 226–27 (1996))). 
15 This definition borrows from Mettler, supra note 12, at 254, in order to explore the 
full range of problems and potential solutions in regards to the Takings Clause and 
property ownership; see also Henri Buenders, The End of Arrogance, The Advent of 
Persuasion: Public Art in a Multicultural Society, 51 SOC. ANALYSIS 42, 48 (2007) (“The 
term ‘public art’ properly refers to works of art in any media that [have] been planned and 
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The modern American street art movement16 emerged in Phil-
adelphia17 and New York18 in the 1960s and 70s promoting social 
commentary and democratization of art. While the cause of this 
street art boom can only be speculated, the counterculture move-
ment that emerged in America during this time was likely a con-
tributing factor.19 It was an artistic expression that was not—and 
could not be—relegated to posh galleries and “high art” shows. 
Instead, it brought art to the everyman by displaying it in the most 
accessible medium possible: open, public space.20 “The existence 
of such works allows artistic expression to leave the confines of the 
traditional gallery or museum and become accessible to every-
one.”21 From the beginning of the modern movement until now, 
pioneers22 and contemporaries used their street art as a way of “in-
itiating . . . political change by creating public awareness, providing 
a social critique, asserting a community’s identity, fostering team 
                                                                                                                            
executed with the specific intention of being sited or staged in the public domain, usually 
outside and accessible to all.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)). 
16 While the modern movement took off in the 1960s and 70s, this was not the first 
emergence of American street art. See Bougdanos, supra note 13, at 558 (“The origins of 
American graffiti can be traced from colonial times through the present. One of the most 
famous and widespread examples of American graffiti was the Kilroy image that 
American soldiers drew on the walls of the cities they occupied during World War II.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
17 See Mettler, supra note 12, at 252 (citing GREGORY J. SNYDER, GRAFFITI LIVES: 
BEYOND THE TAG IN NEW YORK’S URBAN UNDERGROUND 23 (2009)). 
18 See Stephens, supra note 11, at 8; Buenders, supra note 15, at 48. 
19 Buenders, supra note 15, at 44 (“Changes in social, political, and religious beliefs 
have, throughout history, always resulted in parallel changes in the production of public 
art . . . .”). 
20 Id. at 48 (“Art had to be democratized and put on public display. This theory 
became practice in the 1970s, when the aim of art was both embellishment and giving 
meaning to the living environment of the ordinary citizen. Democratized art in a way 
became a state ideology in some countries, celebrating the welfare state and at the same 
time civilizing the people.”). This analysis reinforces the influence that many states saw 
in the social power of art. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Ironically, the state has 
lost sight of this in the modern era, and instead argues that street art contributes to 
uncivilizing the masses. See infra Part II. 
21 Ehret, supra note 10, at 4. 
22 See Stephens, supra note 11, at 11 (identifying “Cornbread . . . , Top Cat, 
SuperKOOL, Priest 167, and Pistol 1” as pioneers of the early evolution of graffiti 
writing); see also Bougdanos, supra note 13, at 561 (describing street artist Keith Haring as 
an influential part of New York street art culture in the 1980s). 
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spirit, and sometimes encouraging action.”23 Such visual images 
have been described as “catalyst[s]”24 that “can evoke passionate 
responses,” especially in regard to political art.25 Street art has also 
been described as a “complex composition of ideas incorporating 
dreams, ambitions, myths, and fears—the many nuances of the ob-
jective and subjective self as a public entity.”26 Thus, these artists 
seek to enlighten and educate blighted communities. By doing so, 
they ironically do not see their illegal art as a contributing factor to 
the blight.27 For some, the illegality of their craft is part of its allure 
and plays into their social commentary.28 For their fans in the sub-
culture, this same illegality seems to draw them in.29 
Popular contemporary street artists who have risen to promi-
nence in the subculture, including Shepard Fairey and Banksy, con-
                                                                                                                            
23 Sabine Marschall, A Critical Investigation into the Impact of Community Mural Art, 
TRANSFORMATION 40, 60 (2004) (citing A.W. BARNETT, COMMUNITY MURALS — THE 
PEOPLE’S ART 15 (1984)). 
24 Id. 
25 K. Gelber, Distracting The Masses: Art, Local Government And Freedom Of Political 
Speech In Australia, 10 L. TEXT CULTURE 195, 195 (2005); see also Susan Bird, Aesthetics, 
Authority and the Outlaw of the Street, 3 J.L. & JUST. 1 (2009) (“I contend that graffiti 
arouses such a response because it changes the way we experience the city. It causes an 
interruption to a commercialized system of signs and codes. It offers a possibility of 
difference and exposes cracks in the ordered routine of everyday life. Street art conveys a 
lifestyle that baffles those driven by a world of economy. It takes inhabitants on a treasure 
hunt to unknown places where countless gifts of creative, unexpected inspiration lie in 
wait.”). 
26 Buenders, supra note 15, at 44 (citation omitted). 
27 See Laura Kaufman, Vandal or Artist?, L.A. TIMES: SAN DIEGO COUNTY ED., July 27, 
1990, at F21B (The author interviewed Brett Cook, who uses unauthorized murals to 
convey messages to the community. Cook claimed he hoped to spread understanding and 
tolerance among blacks and other minority groups. He believed the importance of his 
message, portrayed in artistic themes, outweighed stigma of the illegal installment.). 
28 See Alfredo Aleman, Graffiti Artists Look Toward Los Angeles River for a Canvas, EGP 
(Aug. 13, 2009), http://egpnews.com/?p=11988 (“‘This is the challenge, the more we 
say you shouldn’t do it, the more inviting it is for [graffiti artists] to do it,’ said a street 
artist known as Reyes, who believes much of graffiti’s thrill comes from its illegality.” 
(alteration in original)); see also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 857 F. 
Supp. 1355, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“Indeed, many writers thrive on the push and pull 
with authorities that is inherent to graffiti writing.” (citations omitted)). 
29 See Anna Almendrala, Street Art vs. Graffiti in Los Angeles, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 
2, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/02/los-angeles-street-art-
vs-graffiti_n_816625.html#s233319&title=Street_Art_Has (describing street art fans as 
“enthralled with these artists who would risk violence, fines and imprisonment just to put 
up a piece of art”). 
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tinue this tradition today. Shepard Fairey originally rose to fame 
through his OBEY campaign, where he and his friends posted 
stickers across many major cities with a picture of the late Andre 
the Giant and the word “OBEY” emblazoned on the sticker.30 The 
campaign started in 1989 as a joke and continues to this day.31 It 
uses ridiculous imagery and messaging to elicit amusement and 
make people think about “the advertising and marketing that peo-
ple ingest every day in our consumption-driven society.”32 Thus, 
Fairey sees his work as an exercise in reclaiming public space for 
the public by satirizing the commercialization of public space.33 
Fairey is also no stranger to political satire, engaging in an artis-
tic/advertising back-and-forth on a Rhode Island billboard during a 
political campaign.34 Fairey’s work can be found in and “on” cities 
in the United States, Tokyo, Hong Kong, London, and Barcelona.35 
Banksy, another popular street artist, is probably the most fa-
mous street artist alive. Banksy has been active for the past two 
decades,36 leaving his work across Europe, the Middle East, and 
the United States. While Banksy shrouds his identity in mystery,37 
his art is ironically among the most well known in the world. 
Banksy’s influence and fame was most recently on display during 
his month-long visit to New York City, where he displayed a new 
piece of street art every day for thirty-one days.38 Banksy’s fans and 
detractors39 all flocked around the city in October 2013 on a “scav-
                                                                                                                            
30 Stephens, supra note 11, at 21–22. 
31 Id. at 21. 
32 Id. at 26. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 25–26. 
35 Id. at 21. 
36 STEVE WRIGHT, RICHARD JONES & TREVOR WYATT, BANKSY’S BRISTOL: HOME 
SWEET HOME 32 (2007). 
37 Stephens, supra note 11, at 39–40 (describing two of Banksy’s “friends” that did not 
even know Banksy’s identity). 
38 See generally Roberta Smith, Mystery Man, Painting the Town: Banksy Makes New York 
His Gallery for a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/
31/arts/design/banksy-makes-new-york-his-gallery-for-a-month.html; Cara Buckley, 
Monthlong Chase Around New York City for Banksy’s Street Art, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/nyregion/monthlong-chase-around-new-
york-city-for-banksys-street-art.html. 
39 See Buckley, supra note 38 (quoting Tiffton Meares’ description of Banksy as “a 
fraud”). 
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enger hunt”40 of sorts, trying to find Banksy’s works before they 
were stolen, defaced, covered up, or removed by property own-
ers.41 The irony of Banksy’s campaign against commercialization of 
public space is that he has risen to such fame that his work is worth 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.42 Property owners are usually 
very happy to be gifted with Banksy’s illegal work on their wall or 
building.43 This is because they know that a Banksy work will raise 
their property value and increase foot traffic in and around their 
businesses.44 Many property owners put up plexiglass to ensure 
that others do not deface their new asset.45 Property owners have 
also opted to remove the portion of the wall upon which the Banksy 
work is attached to sell the piece at high-end art galleries.46 
                                                                                                                            
40 See BANKSY DOES NEW YORK (HBO Documentary Films 2014) (chronicling all 31 
days and quoting several people describing finding Banksy’s street art as a scavenger 
hunt). 
41 Several of the paintings were painted over by property owners, or if removable, were 
removed by the property owners. For example, Banksy’s writing on a door was promptly 
removed by property owners. His stencil on a metal gate was also sawed off with power 
tools and stored, and a new gate was put up. See id. 
42 Nishu Kakkar, 12 Most Expensive Banksy Art, MOST EXPENSIVE JOURNAL, 
http://most-expensive.com/banksy-art (last visited May 11, 2015). 
43 See BANKSY DOES NEW YORK, supra note 40 (chronicling property owners thanking 
Banksy for leaving art on their property, and nearby property owners taking steps to 
protect the Banksy work). 
44 See, e.g., Banksy Graffiti Doubles Derelict Pub’s Value, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2008, 
12:39 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/houseprices/3541901/
Banksy-graffiti-doubles-derelict-pubs-value.html (“The Whitehouse pub was originally 
estimated by local estate agents to be worth some £495,000, but its value has now doubled 
to around £1 million, as art dealers scurry to get their hands on it.”); see also Laughing All 
the Way to the Banksy, SUN (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/
features/3187949/Banksy-graffiti-can-push-up-property-price.html (describing a Banksy 
mural raising the property value of a seaside hotel by £150,000); Mark Duell & Sam 
Creighton, Banksy That Appeared On A House Overnight And Tripled Its Value! Graffiti 
Mural Featuring Spies In Trench Coats Is Painted On Wall Of Semi-Detached Home Near 
GCHQ, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 13, 2014, 1:21 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2603782/Banksy-art-work-showing-government-agents-spying-phone-box-appears-Chel
tenham-house-near-GCHQ.html (describing recent Banksy art as raising a home’s 
property value). 
45 See Buckley, supra note 38 (describing several property owners protecting Banksy 
pieces by putting sheets of glass over the work, or hiring security guards to watch over it. 
This is done for good reason, considering that within hours of being sited, a tagger 
defaced a Banksy image of geishas on a bridge). 
46 See Kudler, supra note 3 (describing how many property owners choose to remove 
the portion of their property, be it a wall, door, or gate, and sell it on the open market for 
an enormous profit). 
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Banksy’s three-dimensional works are often stolen by the public 
and commodified in the same way.47 Perhaps this too is part of 
Banksy’s social commentary; in this light, property owners and the 
public add a “performance art” aspect to Banksy’s work, showing 
the great lengths people are willing to go for a payday. 
Despite the growing influence of street art as an accepted art 
form and the potential positive benefits that street art can bring to 
property values, local governments continue to stamp out this 
means of expression48 by labeling it as vandalism in an effort to pro-
tect property rights. 
II. COUNTER TO THE COUNTERCULTURE – STREET ART 
ORDINANCES 
Graffiti is not art. It’s just a senseless thing to do. The 
random tagging of someone’s property without their 
permission, that’s damage to property. That has nothing 
to do with art. It’s a crime. It shouldn’t happen. 
–Charles Williams, the current Streets and 
Sanitation Commissioner for the city of Chicago49 
While street art continues to fuel a subculture and excite popu-
lar culture,50 cities around the nation have met this popularity with 
hardline policies to protect their communities. For example, Los 
Angeles has codified one of the most anti-street art stances in order 
to “protect public and private property from acts of vandalism and 
                                                                                                                            
47 Banksy’s Sphinx sculpture was stolen by nearby business owners and given to a high-
end art gallery in Southampton for sale. Banksy’s “Banksy Balloons” were also attempted 
to be stolen when the culprits were caught by police. See BANKSY DOES NEW YORK, supra 
note 40. 
48 See generally Mettler, supra note 12 (arguing that street art is a means of expression, 
and as such, should enjoy First Amendment protection from government censorship). 
49 Ted Cox, Graffiti Removal Speeds Up as New Reports Decline, DNAINFO (Sept. 4, 
2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140904/downtown/graffiti-
removal-speeds-up-as-new-reports-decline. 
50 See, e.g., Andrew Russeth, L.A. MOCA’s Street-Art Show Sets Attendance Record, 
N.Y. OBSERVER (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.observer.com/2011/08/l-a-mocas-street-
art-show-setsattendance-record (writing that the street art exhibition at Los Angeles’s 
Museum of Contemporary Art, entitled “Art in the Streets,” set attendance records for 
the museum, even surpassing its Andy Warhol retrospective in 2002). 
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defacement.”51 These ordinances do not discriminate between art 
forms, treating gang tagging and street art as two types of the same 
social problem.52 As a result, Los Angeles prohibits persons from 
marking53 public or private property;54 it also prohibits property 
owners and lessees to permit, allow, or otherwise commission graf-
fiti works on their property.55 The mere possession of aerosol graf-
fiti and markers are prohibited within public facilities and parks.56 
Additionally, store owners that sell such art supplies must display 
the supplies in a way that requires employee assistance to facilitate 
customer access.57 Violation of these laws carries civil penalties58 of 
up to $1,000 per violation.59 
                                                                                                                            
51 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.1(E) (2014). 
52 See, e.g., id. § 49.84.2(A), (E) read as follows: 
(A) “Act of graffiti” means an act which causes any form of 
unauthorized inscription, word, figure or design to be marked, 
etched, scratched, drawn, sprayed, painted or otherwise affixed on 
any structural component of any building, structure or other facility 
or upon any other property, regardless of its content or nature and 
regardless of the nature of the material of that structural component 
or property. 
. . . 
(E) “Graffiti” means any form of unauthorized inscription, word, 
figure or design which is marked, etched, scratched, drawn, sprayed, 
painted or otherwise affixed to or on any surface of public or private 
property, including but not limited to, buildings, walls, signs, 
structures or places, or other surfaces, regardless of the nature of the 
material of that structural component. 
See also Ted Cox, Graffiti Fines More than Doubled by Chicago City Council Committee, 
DNAINFO (July 24, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140724/down
town/graffiti-fines-more-than-doubled-by-chicago-city-council-committee (reporting that 
Chicago aldermen “said that gang graffiti and nongang related tagging were equal 
problems, although to varying extents in areas across the city”). 
53 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.3(A) (2014) (prohibiting “any person 
to write, paint, spray, chalk, etch, or otherwise apply graffiti”). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. § 49.84.3(B). 
56 Id. § 49.84.5(A). 
57 Id. § 49.84.4(A)–(B); see also S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 42, § 4201 (2014). 
58 Some cities, such as New York, punish street art with misdemeanor and felony 
charges. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00, 145.05, 145.10, and 145.60 (McKinney 2014). 
59 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, §49.84.12 (2014). 
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When these tools of deterrence do not prove effective,60 the 
city can come onto private property, with the owner’s consent,61 
and remove the street art at the city’s expense.62 Such consent, 
however, is merely a formality because the city can enter the prop-
erty and commence removal of the street art regardless of the 
property owner’s consent;63 to add insult to injury, the city also 
reserves the right to charge the property owner for such noncon-
sensual removal.64 The city can even charge the property owner 
with a misdemeanor and charge the owner $1,000 every day he 
does not comply.65 This scheme undoubtedly persuades many 
property owners to consent to the city’s removal of street art solely 
to protect themselves from carrying the cost of removal.66 
Los Angeles is only one of a growing number of major cities67 
and smaller communities68 adopting such legislation.69 These cities 
                                                                                                                            
60 At least one piece of data suggests that cracking down and increasing fines on graffiti 
vandalism has only a small effect on deterrence. See Cox, supra note 49 (reporting that 
doubling fines for graffiti vandalism in Chicago has resulted in “81,703 graffiti-removal 
requests through August this year [2014], down from 92,980 over the same time last year. 
At the same time, city crews have removed 82,858 pieces of graffiti through August this 
year, closer to the 91,821 removed at this time a year ago.”). 
61 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.7(B)(4), (C) (2014). 
62 Id. § 49.84.7(A)–(B). 
63 Id. § 49.84.8(A). This section applies to vacant property. However, subsection (B), 
which applies to occupied property, also allows the City to enter the property to remove 
the street art regardless of the property owner’s consent pursuant to section 91.8903.3.1 
of the L.A. Municipal Code. 
64 Id. § 49.84.8(A). 
65 Id. § 49.84.12; see also id. § 49.84.10(A) (imposing administrative fines for 
noncompliance). Also of note is that this regulatory scheme has an administrative hearing 
process in which those found to be in violation of the ordinances can enjoy a hearing. See 
id. § 49.84.10(E). 
66 New York, on the other hand, requires its property owners to remove graffiti on 
their premises at their own cost and imposes penalties for noncompliance. See N.Y.C., 
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-117.3 (2014). 
67 See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 74, art. V, § 74–174 (2014); BOS., 
MASS., MUN. CODE ch. XVI, § 16–8.5 (2013); MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 37, §§ 
37–2(f)–(g) (2014); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 5, art. 4, div. 4, §§ 54.0405(b)–
.0407 (2014); S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 23, § 1304(a) (2014); N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-117(a)–(d) (2014). 
68 See, e.g., YPSILANTI, MICH., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 42, art. II, § 42–46(c) (Supp. 
2011); In re Carney, 621 Pa. 476, 482 (2013) (describing a local judge’s participation in the 
Anti-Graffiti Task Force in the city of Eerie, Pennsylvania). 
69 This Article does not seek to catalogue all local government ordinances relating to 
graffiti in this country. Such a catalogue of what may be hundreds of ordinances is outside 
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often rely on the same reasoning to justify their laws: street art is a 
public nuisance70 because it lowers property values; it leads to vio-
lence, crime, and gang activity; and it creates fear and insecurity in 
the community.71 However, emerging data is beginning to demon-
strate how differently street art affects real estate values than does 
graffiti. 
Regarding crime, while empirical data does support findings 
that the presence of graffiti has a snowball effect that raises crime 
rates,72 it does not necessarily correlate to street art. Studies have 
shown that “disorderly physical surroundings,” such as graffiti, 
have a signaling effect that the neighborhood or environment is 
“poorly maintained.” These signals can be perceived as a welcome 
mat to criminals and increase the fear of crime.73 At least some po-
lice officials, however, have the intellectual honesty to admit that 
gang tagging tends to incite more crime and violence than graffiti 
unrelated to gangs.74 Additionally, many community organizations 
exist to protect commissioned street art because of its positive ef-
fects on their community; such organizations argue that the com-
munity should decide how to handle the art it harbors, not the gov-
ernment.75 
Regarding property values, legislatures likely lump graffiti in 
with the effects of crime and social decay when linking street art to 
lower property values. In a national study commissioned by the 
                                                                                                                            
the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article only seeks to offer the reader an introduction 
into this legislative landscape. 
70 See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.6 (2014) (declaring that 
graffiti was considered a public nuisance). 
71 See, e.g., id. § 49.84.1; S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 23 § 1303(a) (2014). 
72 Common sense might persuade people to reject the Broken Windows Theory, that 
increased crime and gang activity is what actually causes an increase in graffiti and street 
art, and not the other way around. But see infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
73 Ariane L. Bedimo-Rung, Ph.D., et al., The Significance of Parks to Physical Activity and 
Public Health: A Conceptual Model, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 159, 164 (2005); see also 
Kees Evert Keizer, The Spreading of Disorder, 322 SCIENCE 1681–85, no. 5908 (2008) 
(finding that an area with graffiti caused twice as many people to engage in littering or 
stealing when compared to behaviors in the same area without graffiti). 
74 See Cox, supra note 49 (reporting that Chicago Police Commander William Dunn 
generally stated “that gang graffiti was more likely to lead to street violence [than 
nongang related tagging], making its removal a necessity”). 
75 Bougdanos, supra note 13, at 549 (referring to the Social and Public Art Resource 
Center). 
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U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1992, researchers were unable 
to “compile any reliable data” that showed that graffiti directly re-
lated to a “decline in the value of real property.”76 As has already 
been argued above, the work of famous street artists can actually 
raise property values.77 Further, there is a growing trend in real es-
tate of commissioned street art correlating to increased property 
values in major cities.78 
The inconsistent reasoning of cities that have adopted anti-
street art campaigns79 leads one to believe that there must be an-
other underlying reason for such a hard-lined stance: money. Paint-
ing over street art is quite costly; perhaps this is what really justifies 
street art ordinances in the eyes of the legislature. Major cities like 
Los Angeles80 and Chicago81 are hit the hardest, dedicating millions 
                                                                                                                            
76 HARRIET H. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., VANDALISM: RESEARCH, PREVENTION, AND 
SOCIAL POLICY 165 (1992) (finding that graffiti caused indirect costs of “decline in the 
value of real property in areas infested by graffiti.” However, the author admitted that he 
or she has “been unable to compile any reliable data for [these] indirect costs.”). 
77 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. Former mayor of New York, Michael 
Bloomberg, disagrees, stating that Banksy and street art in general “does ruin people’s 
property.” See also John Swaine, Banksy ‘Ruining People’s Property,’ Says Michael 
Bloomberg, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2013, 6:13 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/10389870/Banksy-ruining-peoples-property-says-Michael-
Bloomberg.html. However, Shepard Fairey actually denounces street art that lowers 
property value, and encourages other artists “to use public property, such as the sides of 
buildings, street signs, billboards, and poles, or private property, only when it has been 
abandoned or lies vacant.” Stephens, supra note 11, at 27. 
78 See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 17 (finding that illegal street art can contributes to 
gentrification and increase property values in places like SoHo, which have low instances 
of crime); see also Alanna Weismann, Street Art Contributes to Property Values, 
Neighborhood Character in Chelsea, MIDTOWN GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2014, 4:03 PM), 
http://themidtowngazette.com/2014/10/street-art-contributes-to-property-values-neigh
borhood-character-in-chelsea/ (finding that commissioned street art in the Manhattan 
neighborhood of Chelsea increases property values); Bill Kearney, How Wynwood Earned 
Its Street Cred, OCEAN DRIVE, http://oceandrive.com/living/articles/how-graffiti-
transformed-miamis-wynwood-neighborhood (last visited May 11, 2015) (chronicling how 
legal street art contributed to climbing property values in a once abandoned industrial 
sector of Miami, FL). 
79 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-117.1 (2014) (establishing an Anti-Graffiti 
Task Force in the city of New York). 
80 Editorial, Cleaning Up Graffiti’s Act, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/ 2011/sep/04/opinion/la-ed-graffiti-20110904 (“Los Angeles 
spent $7.1 million last year cleaning graffiti.”). 
81 Hal Dardick & John Byrne, Alderman: Helen Keller Could See Graffiti Cancer in 
Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (July 24, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
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of dollars each year to removing street art. Consequently, it should 
be no surprise why cities across the country consider street art a 
nuisance—after all, it is a “cancer”82 that is costing them nearly 
$12 billion every year to treat.83 
The laws that many cities around the country have adopted 
send a clear signal that street art is not welcome. These cities even 
go so far as to categorize street art as a per se nuisance that justifies 
trespassing on private property and destroying a potentially valua-
ble asset of the property owner. These types of laws84 may “go too 
far”85 to be deemed constitutional under existing Supreme Court 
precedent of the Takings Clause and its underlying principles. 
III. AN UNCERTAIN WORLD – TAKINGS CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Under our notions of what constitutes property, I have a 
real problem with the idea that a piece of property—
which is ultimately what a work of art is—cannot be 
treated as other pieces of property by the owner of it. And 
that poses some serious constitutional problems.86 
                                                                                                                            
local/politics/chi-city-graffiti-crackdown-20140724-story.html (“This year, the city [of 
Chicago] is spending $4.9 million on graffiti removal . . . .”). 
82 See id. (quoting a Chicago Alderman describing street art as a cancer that even a 
blind person could recognize). 
83 Deborah Lamm Weisel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 9, Graffiti 2 (Aug. 2004), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/e11011354.pdf (“[A]n estimated $12 billion a year is spent cleaning up graffiti in the 
United States.”). 
84 Consider also Los Angeles’s very strict sign regulations, which “essentially 
prohibit[] all murals, even those commissioned by property owners.” Mettler, supra note 
12 (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. I, art. 4.4, § 14.4.4(B)(10)) (detailing Los Angeles’s 
sign regulations, which would apply to murals and other street art, unless they contained 
writing). 
85 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
86 Eric Felton, New Law Gives Rights to Artists After Work is Sold, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
1990, at F2 (quoting lawyer). This particular critic is weary of artists having rights after 
they transfer ownership of their art to a buyer. This would restrict the buyer from using 
his art as he sees fit, and may result in a constitutional taking. See generally Chintan Amin, 
Keep Your Filthy Hands Off My Painting! The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 and the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 315 (1997) (analyzing the Visual Rights Act 
of 1990 (“VARA”) under the Takings Clause). This logic is also uniquely applicable to 
the inquiry of this Article; even though the critic is not directly addressing a property 
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The rocky road that the Supreme Court has taken to under-
stand the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is one that has in-
spired many constitutional scholars’ study and has even caused 
many laypersons to doubt the Court’s intentions.87 The muddled88 
doctrines have created an uncertain landscape that has diminished 
predictability in governments’ assertion of their eminent domain 
and police powers. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the ques-
tion posed in this Article and to find a solution, the difficult terrain 
of Takings Clause jurisprudence must be traversed. 
Analysis of any legal authority should start with a plain reading 
of its text.89 The Takings Clause states “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”90 “Thus, 
                                                                                                                            
owner’s right to control the uncommissioned art on his property, nonetheless a 
restriction on the property owner’s right to do what he sees fit with his property does 
pose “constitutional problems” that this Article seeks to explore. 
87 Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 
URB. LAW. 201 (2006) (describing a large number of Americans as “dismayed and 
angered” in the aftermath of Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469 (2005), and that 
public opinion polls showed Americans’ widespread opposition to the decision (citing 
Paul Shigley, Backlash Threatens Redevelopment: Eminent Domain Ruling Sparks 
Legislation, Calls for Reform; State Legislation, 20 CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. 1 (2005))). 
88 See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. 
CALIF. L. REV. 561, 562–63, 594–96 (1984) (characterizing Takings Clause doctrine as a 
“muddle”); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2004) (describing 
takings jurisprudence as being unable to be “characterized as unified”). 
89 Such analysis should not necessarily finish at its text. This is especially true for such 
a short and vague clause as the Takings Clause of which there is virtually no discussion in 
the Constitutional Convention debates. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 423 (1st ed. 1968); Eben 
Moglin, The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, 
in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 109, 
138 (Helmholtz et al., eds., 1997) (describing that Framers did not engage in any floor 
debate when drafting or adopting the Fifth Amendment. Neither did the Amendment’s 
drafter, James Madison, leave any thoughts or discourses on the matter.). 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The full Amendment reads as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
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government action that works a taking of property rights necessari-
ly implicates the ‘constitutional obligation to pay just compensa-
tion.’”91 This means that the Takings Clause is not meant to inter-
fere with the government’s ability to take property, but rather to 
secure compensation for a property owner when their property is 
taken.92 
Takings Clause doctrine is best understood as divided between 
three inquiries. First, there is the Takings Inquiry. This is the most 
doctrinally complex of the three, in which courts determine wheth-
er a taking has occurred.93 Second is the Public Use Inquiry. After 
it has been established that a taking has occurred, the constitution-
ality of such a taking must meet the standard of being for a public 
use. Third is the Just Compensation Inquiry. This step determines 
the amount of compensation due to a property owner based on the 
valuation of his taken property. 
A. Takings Inquiry 
The obscure puzzle of the Takings Inquiry becomes more lucid 
when differentiating between two types of takings: physical takings 
and regulatory takings.94 A physical taking is exactly as it sounds; it 
                                                                                                                            
The placement of the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment is a curious decision of its 
drafter, James Madison. The Takings Clause seems out of place among what are 
understood as rights of criminal defendants. Perhaps the context of the Takings Clause is 
easiest explained by the preceding Due Process Clause, which protects against the 
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property”; understandably, the more specific deprivation 
of private property seems to flow naturally from the broader Due Process Clause. 
91 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) 
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
92 James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 
ENVTL. L. 143, 145 n.18 (1995). 
93 Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 55, 56–57 (1990) (“One of the most intractable and significant problems facing the 
Supreme Court today is the task of determining when governmental action that causes 
economic injury to private parties constitutes a compensable “taking” under the Takings 
Clause of the fifth amendment.” Peterson describes “four different tests” that the Court 
has used in the Takings Inquiry, which I have outlined below). 
94 See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992) (“Most of our cases 
interpreting the Clause fall within two distinct classes. Where the government authorizes 
a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title), . . . [and] where the government 
merely regulates the use of property . . . .”); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (describing the “longstanding 
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generally applies to the government’s exercise of eminent domain 
to take physical property.95 However, physical takings can also ap-
ply to physical invasions of private property caused by government 
actors.96 A regulatory taking is different insofar as the government 
does not take ownership or invade physical property, but instead 
exercises its police power to regulate how a property owner uses 
his property.97 
In order to determine if a taking has occurred, different but re-
lated tests apply to each type of taking. As this Article explores be-
low, there are identifiable underlying principles that bind these 
substantially different types of takings together. These underlying 
principles help inform the predictability of Takings Clause juris-
prudence, which has sustained a history of doctrinal volatility. 
The application of the Takings Clause was not always so diffi-
cult; since colonial times, the requirement of just compensation for 
a government taking was understood to only apply to physical tak-
ings of property that resulted from the state’s exercise of its emi-
nent domain power.98 While this power was primarily used for the 
acquisition of real property for the building of public roads and 
governmental buildings, it was also used to acquire chattel property 
to contribute to building efforts or war efforts.99 The Takings 
                                                                                                                            
distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one hand, and 
regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other” as being so distinct as to rely upon two 
separate lines of precedent); S. Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of S. Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 
649 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he attempt to differentiate ‘regulation’ 
from ‘taking’ [has been characterized] as ‘the most haunting jurisprudential problem in 
the field of contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer’s equivalent of the 
physicist’s hunt for the quark.’” (quoting C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 
1976))). 
95 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522. 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
97 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522. 
98 See generally Michael R. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the 
Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth 
Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008) (arguing that the original Takings 
Clause as adopted in the Fifth Amendment does not support regulatory takings, but only 
physical takings. However, the adoption and incorporation of the Takings Clause through 
the Fourteenth Amendment expanded its application as applied to the states, allowing it 
to include regulatory takings.). 
99 Ely, supra note 5, at 4, 12–13 (1992) (noting that during colonial times, several states 
took land and supplies for building roads and bridges, and for taking supplies during the 
704 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:685 
 
Clause itself did not start to enjoy frequent considerations by the 
Court until the late 1800s; when it was interpreted, it applied to 
physical takings of real property.100 Around the turn of the century, 
however, things began to change. 
1. Regulatory Takings 
Determining when a regulatory taking has occurred is an elu-
sive inquiry because of the lack of practical rules. In the Court’s 
attempt to determine when “a regulation goes too far”101 so as to 
constitute a taking,102 it has admitted that it has “eschewed any 
‘set formula’ for determining how far is too far.”103 Instead, it re-
lies on “ad hoc, factual inquiries” involving several factors.104 
The dilemma began when the Court broadened the Takings 
Clause in the late 1800s in cases like Chicago, Burlington and Quincy 
Railroad Co. v. Chicago.105 Chicago involved the city of Chicago 
                                                                                                                            
Revolutionary War; payment was required for these takings). But see MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 63–64 (1977); William 
M. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1985) (arguing that the compensation principle 
goes against the common practice of the revolutionary time period, where colonial 
governments would take “without compensating the owner.”); Maureen Struab 
Kordesh, “I Will Build My House With Sticks”: The Splintering of Property Interests Under 
the Fifth Amendment May Be Hazardous to Private Property, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 397, 
409–11 (1996). 
100 See Lucas v. S.C. Coast Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (“Prior to Justice 
Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was generally thought that the 
Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, . . . or the functional 
equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’” (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted)). 
101 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
102 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2004) (“The rub, of course, 
has been—and remains—how to discern how far is ‘too far.’”). 
103 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (1992) (“In 70-odd years of succeeding ‘regulatory takings’ 
jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any ‘set formula’ for determining how far is 
too far, preferring to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 174–75 (1979) (citation omitted); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
594 (1962) (“There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking 
begins.”). 
104 Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 175 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). 
105 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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condemning property to widen a street.106 A jury decided the prop-
er amount of just compensation to be paid to several property own-
ers, yet only awarded Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad 
Company one dollar for the City’s taking of its right of way “to be 
used for the purposes of the proposed street.”107 Thus, the issue 
before the Court was that of just compensation due to the railroad 
company’s diminished use of land, not the physical taking of land. 
The Court slightly departed from its physical taking application of 
the Takings Clause by finding that the railroad company was enti-
tled to just compensation for the diminution in value of the land 
caused by the encumbrance of “a perpetual right in the public to 
use it for the purpose of a street.”108 The Court found that due 
process, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, required just 
compensation for takings under the Constitution;109 ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                            
106 Id. at 230. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 233. 
109 At least one scholar has suggested that Chicago should be categorized as a case that 
contributes to due process jurisprudence, not Takings Clause law. See Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings 
“Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 843–52, 862–67 (2006). The research of this Article 
has reached a different conclusion, which is also consistent with reigning Supreme Court 
doctrine since Penn Central. While the Court employed the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to come to a decision in Chicago, this was merely the procedural 
vehicle that was used to apply the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the state of 
Illinois. This conclusion is supported by the Court’s own statement: 
Whatever may have been the power of the States on this subject prior 
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it 
seems clear that, since that amendment went into effect, such 
limitations and restraints have been placed upon their power in 
dealing with individual rights that the States cannot now lawfully 
appropriate private property for the public benefit or to public uses 
without compensation to the owner, . . . and that, without such 
compensation, . . . no matter under what form of procedure it is 
taken, would violate the provisions of the federal Constitution. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. at 238–39 (quoting Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395–96 (1888)). 
Consequently, Chicago is cited by most Supreme Court precedent on takings as the case 
that incorporated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, making it applicable to the states. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 
122; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994); Palazzo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 617 
(2001); see also Rappaport, supra note 98, at 744 n.57 (“The incorporation of the Takings 
Clause is usually thought to have occurred in [Chicago].”). But see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 
n.5, 404–05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chicago is actually grounded in 
“‘substantive due process,’ rather than in the view that the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
706 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:685 
 
Court decided that the jury’s verdict sufficiently awarded just 
compensation because the jury likely found that the railroad com-
pany’s use of its railroad across the proposed street would not be 
damaged.110 
While the fact pattern in Chicago is not completely analogous to 
modern regulatory takings,111 it appears to be one of the first in-
stances that the Court applied the Takings Clause to a government 
action that affected a property owner’s use of his land.112 The 
Court expanded on this logic in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,113 
which is seen by many as the genesis of regulatory takings.114 In 
Mahon, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Kohler Act, which 
changed the status quo of coal mining property rights in the state.115 
The Kohler Act significantly regulated the amount of coal that 
mining companies (who had subterranean property rights) could 
mine, and thus “destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property 
and contract.”116 In determining whether the law constituted a tak-
ing of the coal companies’ property, the court considered “the ex-
tent of diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if 
not all cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain and 
                                                                                                                            
Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But there 
is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States”). 
110 Chicago, 166 U.S. at 242, 257–58. 
111 Modern regulatory takings are usually not related to corresponding physical takings 
of the government, as was the case in Chicago. 
112 This Article does not argue that Chicago is the genesis of regulatory takings, but 
merely that it represented a move in the Court’s understanding of the Takings Clause in a 
broader light. In fact, the railroad company’s loss of certain rights to exclude the public 
from traversing its property as part of a public street is more akin to a physical taking in 
which a government action diminishes the owner’s right to exclude. See Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979). 
113 260 U.S. 393 (1992). 
114 See Jeffrey A. Wilcox, Taking Cover: Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence as a Tool 
for Resolving Water Disputes in the American West, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 490 (2003) 
(“Mahon reflected the Court’s first explicit recognition that though all regulation affects 
property rights, there is a point at which the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is 
triggered despite the regulation being a legitimate exercise of police power”); Peter L. 
Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and the Logically 
Antecedent Question: A Practitioner’s Guide to Fifth Amendment Takings of Wetlands, 3 
ENVTL. LAW. 407, 412–13 n.25 (1997). 
115 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. 
116 Id. at 412. 
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compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends on the 
particular facts.”117 Although the requisite amount of diminution 
was not fleshed out by the Court, it ultimately held that the Kohler 
Act was a taking that required just compensation because it “af-
fect[ed] the mining of coal . . . where the right to mine such coal 
has been reserved.”118 The Court saw this ruling as a necessary 
check on the police power of the state, which had the potential to 
be extended to such lengths to be a dangerous threat to private 
property.119 Realizing the need to curb this danger to a free socie-
ty,120 the court handed down “[t]he general rule . . . that, while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far, it will be recognized as a taking.”121 
Unfortunately, determining when a “regulation goes too far” is 
not an easy task. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York122 was one of the Court’s attempts to do just that. The Penn 
Central Transportation Company, which owned the iconic Grand 
Central Terminal in New York City, wanted to construct a multi-
story office building on top of the famous train station;123 however, 
because the terminal was deemed a “landmark” by the recently 
created New York Land Preservation Commission, Penn Central 
                                                                                                                            
117 Id. at 413; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
118 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. 
119 “The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is 
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without 
compensation . . . . When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by 
the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification 
more and more, until at last private property disappears.” Id. at 415. On the other hand, 
the Court also recognized that there was a spectrum of the use of police powers by stating 
that “[g]overnment could hardly go on if, to some extent, values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long 
recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the 
police power.” Id. at 413. Thus, Mahon was probably the Court’s best attempt at the time 
to strike the right balance between protecting property rights, and allowing the 
government enough room to function efficiently. 
120 See Huffman, supra note 92, at 146 (“The takings clause exists, along with the rest of 
the Bill of Rights, because the constitutional framers understood the inevitability of the 
tyranny of the majority in an unlimited democracy.” (citing James Madison, THE 
FEDERALIST No. 10)). 
121 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). 
122 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
123 Id. at 112. 
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had to have its plans approved.124 When the Commission rejected 
its development plans, Penn Central sued arguing that the denial of 
building the office structure, which would potentially result in large 
lease revenues, was an unconstitutional taking of its right to devel-
op its property.125 The Court developed a three-factor test to ana-
lyze whether a regulatory scheme was a taking “by engaging in es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several fac-
tors—such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interfer-
ence with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the 
character of the governmental action.”126 The Court ultimately 
found that New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law did not 
amount to a regulatory taking because the restrictions did not “in-
terfere in any way with the present use of the Terminal . . . . So the 
law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Cen-
tral’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”127 
Thus, Penn Central could still use the Terminal as it originally ex-
pected to in an economically beneficial way.128 Such a result was 
not “of such a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of emi-
nent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’”129 
Next, the Court seemed to informally abandon the three Penn 
Central factors in Agins v. City of Tiburon,130 in which the Court fa-
vored a revamped two-factor approach.131 Agins involved a munici-
                                                                                                                            
124 Id. at 117. 
125 Penn Central is the quintessential regulatory takings case: a government regulation 
has affected a property owner’s ability to use their land as they see fit, thus “taking” the 
owner’s property rights as well as economic benefit. 
126 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 
U.S. at 124). 
127 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136. The Court also reasoned that the petitioner in Penn 
Central still retained the value of its air rights for the airspace above the Terminal; 
however, this holding is less important to the crux of this Article. 
128 Thus, the Court’s logic in finding that there was no regulatory taking rested 
primarily on the “investment-backed expectation” prong. The three-part test was never 
meant to be a mechanical checklist of elements, but more of an inquiry of balancing, 
where the three factors are weighed to determine when a regulation or law “goes too far.” 
Because investment-backed expectations were not affected at all, this factor alone was 
able to tip the scale in the direction that the regulation did not constitute a taking. 
129 Id. at 136 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)) (alteration in 
original). 
130 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
131 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) 
(“The two factors that the Court considered relevant, have become integral parts of our 
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pal zoning ordinance put into effect after petitioners had acquired 
five acres of land.132 As a result of the ordinance that restricted use 
of the land to “one-family dwellings,” the petitioners were no 
longer able to develop the land and build more lucrative residenc-
es.133 The Court dictated its two-part rule134 for regulatory takings: 
a law “effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner economical-
ly viable use of his land.”135 Consequently, because the Court 
found that the zoning ordinance fulfilled the legitimate state goal of 
“discourage[ing] the ‘premature and unnecessary conversion of 
open-space land to urban uses,’”136 the ordinance was not deemed 
a taking. 
Notwithstanding the thick doctrinal conflict at the time, the 
Court did simplify the Takings Inquiry by establishing a per se rule 
in regulatory takings in Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council.137 
The per se rule established in Lucas dictates that a taking will be 
found when a regulation calls upon an owner “to sacrifice all eco-
nomically beneficial uses”138 of his property.139 Lucas, the petition-
                                                                                                                            
Takings Clause analysis. We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it 
‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land.’” (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)). 
132 Agins, 447 U.S. at 257. 
133 Id. at 258. As a result, the petitioners “contended, the city had ‘completely 
destroyed the value of [appellants’] property for any purpose or use whatsoever . . . .” Id. 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
134 Perhaps themselves realizing the tumultuousness of Takings Clause law as it then 
stood, the Court admitted that “no precise rule determines when property has been 
taken.” Id. at 260–61 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 164 (1979)). 
135 Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)). While these factors seem 
distinctly different from the three Penn Central factors, they should rather be understood 
as a modification. The first Agins factor—denial of economically viable use of land—is 
really a combination of the “economic impact” and “investment backed-expectation” 
factors in Penn Central. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485, 493 (citing the Agins and Penn 
Central as authority for the application of the two Agins factors, then analyzing the 
“Diminution of Value and Investment-Backed Expectations” as part of its two part Agins 
analysis, even though these factors more closely correspond with the factors in Penn 
Central). The second Agins factor—the substantial advancement of a legitimate state 
interest—is actually a modification of the “character of the government action” factor in 
Penn Central. 
136 Id. at 261 (quoting CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65561(b) (West Supp. 1979)). 
137 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
138 Id. at 1019. 
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ing property owner, bought two residential lots on a South Carolina 
beach where he intended to build single family homes and render a 
substantial profit.140 This investment was dashed when South Car-
olina enacted a law that prevented all development activities in 
“coastal zones” in order to prevent erosion of beachfront land.141 
Upon the finding that the law had rendered Lucas’s property val-
ueless,142 the Court found that a taking had occurred because Lu-
cas’s investment-backed expectations to build single-family homes 
on his property had been destroyed.143 Thus, the severity of the 
law’s economic impact and destruction of Lucas’s investment-
backed expectations of the future use of his land led the Court to 
conclude that a taking had occurred. 
This per se rule, however, most readily applied to laws that 
permanently robbed an owner of all economical use of his land.  
Additionally, a regulation that temporarily robbed a property owner 
of all economic value was also considered by the Court in First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.144 In First 
English, Los Angeles County passed an interim ordinance that pre-
vented development of land that had recently been devastated by 
flooding in the Angeles National Forest.145 The First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church challenged the ordinance; the Church 
                                                                                                                            
139 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2004) (describing the Lucas 
rule as establishing “per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes”). However, this 
understanding of Lucas may not be correct considering the following language of the 
Court: “Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry 
into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part 
of his title to begin with.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. Thus, the Court is saying that even 
when a government action strips all economically beneficial use of land from its owner, it 
is still possible that such an action would not constitute a taking if the owner’s 
investment-backed expectations were not affected. 
140 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008. 
141 Id. 
142 The Court relied upon the state trial court’s determination that the land was 
“valueless.” Id. at 1006, 1009. 
143 Id. at 1027, 1031–32. 
144 482 U.S. 304 (1987). Temporary takings had been considered before in 
Massachusetts during colonial times, “[w]here lawmakers required the payment of 
damages for an interim taking of land as part of a flood control project where temporary 
dams would be built to [f]acilitate the removal of obstructions.” Ely, supra note 5, at 13. 
145 First English, 482 U.S. at 307. 
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owned land in the area and lost several buildings to the flood.146 
Thus, the ordinance deprived them of the economic use of this 
land by precluding them from reconstructing the buildings and re-
establish their activities there.147 Because of the procedural posture 
of the case, the Takings Inquiry was not before the Court; instead, 
the Court assumed a taking had occurred and answered the Just 
Compensation Inquiry by stating that the “Just Compensation 
Clause requires the government to pay for ‘temporary’ regulatory 
takings.”148 
First English, however, was largely abrogated when the Takings 
Inquiry was before the Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.149 In Tahoe, a temporary moratori-
um was enacted on building and development on certain land sur-
rounding Lake Tahoe in California and Nevada. The Court rea-
soned that such a temporary restriction merely caused a diminution 
in value, and could not render the estate valueless because the val-
ue would return once the restriction was lifted.150 While the court 
still left open the possibility that a temporary regulatory taking 
could be a taking,151 it is difficult to imagine one that is so invasive 
that it makes up for its own temporary nature. 
In the years after Lucas, the Court has largely solved its doctri-
nal conflict152 between Penn Central and Agins. While the Agins test 
has been cited multiple times in regulatory takings cases,153 the 
court abrogated Agins in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.154 Lingle clearly 
laid out the Court’s rule of law by stating that Lucas was a per se 
                                                                                                                            
146 Id. at 308. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 313 (footnote omitted). 
149 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
150 Id. at 332. 
151 Id.at 337 (“[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction 
precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given 
exclusive significance one way or the other.”). 
152 The conflict is only doctrinal, as the black letter law seemingly conflicts; in practice, 
the factors essentially lead to the same outcomes because of their similarities. See supra 
note 137. 
153 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Bituminous 
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
154 544 U.S. 528 (2004). 
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test that was determinative of the Takings Inquiry in regulatory 
takings;155 when a case fell short of meeting the “sacrifice [of] all 
economically beneficial uses” articulated in Lucas, the Penn Central 
factors were the appropriate determinatives of the Takings In-
quiry.156 
2. Physical Takings 
Physical takings represent the traditional view of takings as un-
derstood until the turn of the century.157 The standard procedure 
for such a taking begins with the government’s commencement of 
condemnation proceedings; after such commencement, the gov-
ernment and property owner enter into negotiations, and some-
times litigate to decide the Just Compensation Inquiry. This usual-
ly provides a straightforward application of the law: “Where the 
government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actu-
ally takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensa-
tion.”158 However, situations arise where the government believes 
its physical occupation or invasion does not constitute a taking, and 
the property owner must himself commence inverse condemnation 
proceedings to solve the Takings Inquiry.159 
                                                                                                                            
155 Id. at 538. 
156 Id. at 538–39 (“[R]egulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set 
forth in Penn Central . . . .”); see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 511, 518, 521 (2012). See generally Wilcox, supra note 114 (an example of pre-Lingle 
scholarship advocating for a return to the Penn Central factors to govern regulatory 
takings in light of the Court’s inconsistent precedent). 
157 See Rappaport, supra note 98, at 736 (citing Treanor, supra note 99, at 791 n.50) 
(arguing that the original application of state takings clauses at the time of the adoption of 
the Fifth Amendment “suggest that the Federal Takings Clause was understood as 
extending only to physical takings, since the state and federal clauses used similar 
language”). 
158 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 
(“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from 
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.” (citation omitted)). 
159 See generally, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 511; Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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For example, the government did not believe its actions consti-
tuted a taking in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.160 In Kaiser, peti-
tioners created a marina by dredging and filling a pond, thereby 
connecting it to a publicly owned bay and the Pacific Ocean.161 As a 
result of this newly created marina’s connection to publicly held 
waters, the government asserted that the public had a right to enter 
the waters of the marina because the connection of these waters 
made the once-private pond a “navigable water[] of the United 
States,” to which citizens enjoy access.162 The Court deemed such 
an action of the government as tantamount to a physical taking be-
cause “the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context 
will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned ma-
rina.”163 Such an invasion, even though only amounting to an 
easement, nevertheless deprived the petitioning owners of one of 
the most fundamental rights of private property: the right to ex-
clude.164 Thus, the Court held that “even if the Government phys-
ically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless 
pay just compensation.”165  
The Court relied upon its logic in Kaiser when establishing a per 
se rule166 for physical takings in Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.167 Loretto involved a New York statute that required 
landowners to permit cable television companies to install its 
CATV cables and directional taps upon their property.168 Even 
                                                                                                                            
160 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
161 Id. at 166–67. 
162 Id. at 168–69. 
163 Id. at 180. 
164 See id. at 180 n.11 (“As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, ‘[a]n essential element of 
individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))); see also infra Part II.A.3.b and accompanying notes. 
165 Id.; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987) (finding 
that the government’s imposition of a permanent public easement across a private beach 
constituted a taking). 
166 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2004) (describing the holding 
in Loretto as a precedent that established a per se taking rule). 
167 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
168 Id. at 421–22 (“[The cable company] installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch 
in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building about 
18 inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 
inches, on the front and rear of the roof. By June 8, 1970 the cable had been extended 
714 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:685 
 
though the installation of such discreet cables and equipment was 
minimal, the Court found that the law nonetheless constituted a 
taking because a government’s imposition of a permanent occupa-
tion on a property owner’s property effectively destroys the own-
er’s right to “‘possess, use, and dispose of [the property].’”169 
Therefore, no matter how small the physical invasion might be, 
such property rights of owners will always be affected, and conse-
quently, always effect a taking. 
Like in Lucas, an important part of the Loretto per se rule is the 
permanent physical occupation of property; temporary physical oc-
cupations or invasions “are subject to a more complex balancing 
process to determine whether they are a taking.”170 The Court 
clarified this when citing to Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,171 
in which “the Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that 
shopping center owners permit individuals to exercise free speech 
and petition rights on their property, to which they had already in-
vited the general public.”172 In its attempt to weigh appropriate fac-
tors, the Court noted that because the invasion of unwanted per-
sons “was temporary and limited in nature, and since the owner 
had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his 
property ‘the fact that [the solicitors] may have ‘physically invaded’ 
[the owners’] property cannot be viewed as determinative.’”173 Thus, 
Pruneyard was an example where the temporary abrogation of the 
right to exclude was a factor, but not dispositive when considering 
mitigating factors. 
In no way did Loretto or Pruneyard foreclose on the possibility 
of temporary physical occupations or invasions being considered as 
takings; rather, the Court has a wealth of precedent from the 
World War II era that holds the exact opposite. During the war, the 
government temporarily condemned many properties, or otherwise 
temporarily commandeered factories to produce much needed 
                                                                                                                            
another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run from the directional taps to the adjoining 
building at 305 West 105th Street.”). 
169 Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)); 
see also infra Part II.A.3.b and accompanying notes. 
170 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 435 n.12. 
171 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
172 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434. 
173 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84) (footnote omitted). 
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supplies for the war.174 This included the temporary seizure of 
storage warehouses,175 a laundry facility,176 and the take-over of a 
coal mine to prevent a national strike.177 While these cases actually 
contemplated the government’s control over a physical structure 
or operation on real property, the Court also found a taking when 
government military aircraft flew at low altitudes over a dwelling 
and chicken farm in United States v. Causby.178 This case involved 
the military’s temporary use of a nearby airport. The Court found a 
taking, even though there was no physical occupation; instead, 
there was merely an invasion of noise and light.179 These indirect 
invasions caused the owners to give up their chicken business and 
heightened their anxiety.180 In essence, the Court found that the 
low altitude fly-overs were tantamount to taking a fee interest 
easement of the land, even though “enjoyment and use of the land 
are not completely destroyed.”181 
Most recently, the Court revisited the principles of temporary 
physical takings in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United 
States.182 Arkansas Game and Fish Commission involved the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers’ periodic deviation from their Wa-
ter Control Manual, which governed seasonal water release rates 
from a dam they controlled in Arkansas.183 From 1993 through 
2000, the Corps released less water from the dam to accommodate 
farmers downstream, but in turn caused the loss of 18 million board 
feet of lumber due to flooding on the Arkansas Game and Fish 
Commission’s wooded property.184 Although the flooding would 
                                                                                                                            
174 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 (2012) 
(outlining World War II precedent on temporary takings). 
175 E.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U. S. 261, 267 (1950); 
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
176 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). 
177 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951). But see Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. 
United States, 395 U. S. 85, 93 (1969) (finding that the “temporary, unplanned 
occupation” of building by troops under exigent circumstances was not a taking). 
178 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
179 Id. at 259. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 262. 
182 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
183 Id. at 516. 
184 Id. at 516–17. 
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eventually recede each year, the Court found this temporary inva-
sion of property caused by the Corps to be a taking to which just 
compensation was due.185 After outlining extensive precedent on 
past flooding cases and several cases of temporary physical takings, 
the Court concluded that “government-induced flooding can con-
stitute a taking of property, and because a taking need not be per-
manent to be compensable, our precedent indicates that govern-
ment-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensa-
ble.”186 
Doctrinally, the Court importantly clarified several relevant 
factors it considers in temporary physical takings cases, including 
the temporariness or permanence of the taking; whether “the inva-
sion is intended or is the foreseeable result of . . . government ac-
tion”; and the “severity of the interference.”187 As hinted at in Ar-
kansas Game and Fish Commission, these factors are highly analo-
gous and track closely to the Penn Central factors applicable in reg-
ulatory takings.188 
3. Underlying Principles 
While the Court has attempted to clarify the Takings Inquiry in 
the past decade, the Court’s turbulent applications of these tests 
require a deeper inquiry into its reasoning and justifications for do-
ing so. In many ways, the underlying principles that gird these dif-
fering factors are more useful to the student of Takings Clause law 
than the more elusive “black letter” of the law.189 
                                                                                                                            
185 Id. at 519. 
186 Id. But see Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149 (1924) (finding that to be 
a taking, flooding must “constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting 
to an appropriation of, and not merely an injury to, the property”). 
187 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519–20. 
188 “[A]side from the cases attended by [the per se rules of Loretto and Lucas], most 
takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries.” Id. at 518 (citing Penn Cent. 
Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). This citation to Penn 
Central almost hints that its three factors are determinative of all takings outside of the per 
se rules, both physical and regulatory. 
189 Peterson, supra note 93, at 161–62 (arguing that the Court’s Takings Clause 
jurisprudence is not attributable to doctrine, but rather relies on their notions of fairness). 
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a) One Unfairly and Unjustly Bearing the Cost for the 
Community 
One of the underlying principles of the Takings Clause “is to 
bar [the] Government from forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”190 Thus, the difficulty has come in determining 
when the government’s imposition upon the property rights of an 
individual property owner is so unfair and unjust to validate the 
community’s compensation of that property owner. 
This principle was expressly evoked191 in Agins, and is partly re-
sponsible for guiding the Court to its holding. In Agins, the Court’s 
recognition that “[t]he determination that governmental action 
constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at 
large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exer-
cise of state power in the public interest.”192 Consequently, be-
cause the zoning ordinance affected many property owners and did 
not single out the petitioner’s five acres of land, the petitioner was 
not asked to bear the burden of the exercise of state power on its 
own;193 rather, the effects would naturally be spread out to the en-
tire community.194 Thus, compensating the owners of a taking was 
                                                                                                                            
190 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); see also Ely, supra note 5, at 3 (“The rationale behind the 
takings clause was that the financial burden of public policy should not be unfairly placed 
on individual property owners but shared by the public as a whole.”). 
191 The term “expressly evoked” is quite intentional because this bedrock principle 
underlies all takings cases, even though it may not be mentioned. In fact, it is one of the 
principles of fairness and justice upon which the Takings Clause is predicated upon. 
192 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 
U.S. 1 (1984) (“The principle that underlies [protecting investment-backed expectations] 
is that, while most burdens consequent upon government action undertaken in the public 
interest must be borne by individual landowners as concomitants of the advantage of 
living and doing business in a civilized community, some are so substantial and 
unforeseeable, and can so easily be identified and redistributed, that “justice and 
fairness” require that they be borne by the public as a whole.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
193 Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. 
194 But see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (“If the 
Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California’s attempt to remedy these 
problems, although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the 
State’s action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings 
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
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unnecessary to properly balance the government’s need with the 
social and economic harm to the property owner. 
This underlying principle was further explored by the Court in 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,195 in which the 
Court addressed another Pennsylvania law regulating coal min-
ing,196 the Subsidence Act.197 The law empowered a state agency to 
prevent coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from 
mines located beneath buildings in order to protect the public in-
terest in having structural integrity of surface buildings.198 Citing 
Agins, the Court recognized that a taking is usually found when the 
public should bear the burden of a governmental exercise of power, 
rather than a single property owner.199 The Court found that de-
termining when this threshold is crossed “‘necessarily requires a 
weighing of private and public interests.’”200 The Court’s conclu-
sion that the Subsidence Act “plainly seeks to further” the public 
interest of enjoying structural integrity201 was therefore enough to 
                                                                                                                            
Clause is to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”); Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954) (justifying a regulatory scheme targeting blight because no 
single property owner bore the burden of the scheme alone, but rather the entire 
community; “[i]f owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment 
programs on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public 
interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly”); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Corp. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (finding that the property owner alone was 
not burdened with the City’s landmarks law, but rather that “all the structures contained 
in the 31 historical districts and over 400 individual landmarks” also bore the burden of 
the regulatory scheme). 
195 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
196 The Court recognized the similarities to Mahon, in which a taking was found to 
occur when the Kohler Act regulated subterranean coal mining rights. Id. at 473; see also 
supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
197 Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 1406.1–.21 (West 2014). 
198 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478–79. 
199 Id. at 492. 
200 Id. 
201 The Court likened this public interest to those of preventing public nuisances. There 
have been many cases where the Court has recognized that a taking does not occur when 
the state is using its police power to prevent a public nuisance that is injurious to the 
community. See id. at 489–91 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1926) (holding 
that the Takings Clause did not require the State of Virginia to compensate the owners of 
cedar trees when the state ordered them destroyed to prevent the spread of an 
agricultural disease to a nearby apple orchard under nuisance doctrine); Euclid v. Amber 
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outweigh the private economic interests of the coal companies, 
who were still able to make a profit202 by mining coal.203 Thus, this 
principle of fairly and justly distributing harm of government action 
to the community as a whole is an important undercurrent in Tak-
ings Clause doctrine. 
b) Property as a Bundle of Rights 
The next important undercurrent is the Court’s recognition of 
the impact that takings have on depriving owners of meaningful 
sticks in their bundle of property rights. In Andrus v. Allard,204 a 
law that prohibited the sale of eagle products was challenged by 
Native American artifact dealers who sold eagle feathers.205 The 
law was not deemed a taking since “there was no physical invasion 
                                                                                                                            
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (finding a zoning ordinance excluding industrial 
establishments was constitutional under a nuisance theory and the proper use of police 
power); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (finding no taking 
occurred when a town enacted an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavation 
because it was a proper exercise of police power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 
(1887) (finding no taking when a state prohibited the manufacturing of liquor because it 
was a proper exercise of the police power to prevent the public nuisance of bars and 
places where intoxicating liquors are bought and sold); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 
394 (1915) (finding no taking occurred when a city enacted an ordinance preventing the 
operation of a brickyard due to noxious odors that constituted a public nuisance); 
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) 
(finding no taking occurred when the government prohibited the manufacture of 
oleomargarine to protect “dairymen, and to prevent deception in sales of butter and 
cheese,” despite the owner’s allegation that “if prevented from continuing it, the value of 
his property employed therein would be entirely lost and he be deprived of the means of 
livelihood”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023–26 (1992) 
(describing the Court’s early precedent on “‘[h]armful or noxious use’ analysis”); 
Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879) (finding that it was lawful for the government 
to destroy property without compensation to the owner in order to prevent the spreading 
of a fire). 
202 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, at 496 
(1987)(“[P]etitioners have never claimed that their mining operations, or even any 
specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was passed. Nor is there 
evidence that mining in any specific location affected by the 50% rule has been 
unprofitable.”). 
203 The Court also found that the diminution of value of the coal companies’ 
subterranean mining rights was not substantial enough to outweigh the public interests. 
This was another way this case was distinguished from Mahon, which made the mining of 
certain coal “commercially impracticable.” Id. at 493. 
204 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
205 Id. at 54. 
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or restraint upon [eagle products]”206 and it was “not clear that 
appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the arti-
facts.”207 The Court seemed to reach this conclusion by relying on 
the logic that “where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of proper-
ty rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a tak-
ing, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”208 Thus, 
lack of any physical confiscation of the eagle feathers meant that 
the artifact dealers maintained their traditional property right to 
possess, transport, and gift the property,209 but merely lost a strand 
of their property rights by not being able to dispose of their proper-
ty as they saw fit.210 
By contrast, the Court found a taking had occurred in Hodel v. 
Irving,211 which considered the Indian Land Consolidation Act.212 
This Act sought to remedy a failed policy of the late 19th century to 
grant individual Indians ownership of parcels of communal Indian 
reservations.213 Over several generations, the ownership of the par-
cels became so splintered among various heirs that the land could 
not be used beneficially.214 Section 207 of the Act prohibited cer-
tain types of land with splintered ownership from passing to the 
next generation (further splintering ownership), instead passing the 
land ownership back to the tribe.215 The Court found that the eco-
nomic impacts were minimal, but not trivial.216 The Court even 
                                                                                                                            
206 Id. at 65. 
207 Id. at 66. It is important to note that this is essentially a manifestation of the two 
Agins factors articulated in the Court’s next term. 
208 Id. at 66–67. 
209 Id. at 65–66 (finding that the deprivation of an important “strand” in the bundle of 
property rights of the coal companies did not constitute a taking); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (finding no taking had occurred, in part, because “the 
ordinance did not extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership” (quotation omitted)). 
210 Arguably, had the Penn Central test been applied, a different result would have been 
likely. The Court may have found a taking when considering that the law greatly impacted 
the economic market of selling eagle feathers and impacted the Native American artifact 
dealers’ bottom line; additionally, this effected the dealers’ investment-backed interests 
because the dealers had already acquired these feathers through likely monetary means 
with plans to acquire a return from the sale of such feathers for a profit. 
211 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
212 25 U.S.C. § 2201–2221 (2012). 
213 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 706–08. 
214 Id. at 709. 
215 Id. 
216 Id.at 714–15. 
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stated that “[i]f we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might 
well find § 207 constitutional.”217 However, the Court ultimately 
found a taking occurred because “the character of the Government 
regulation here is extraordinary.”218 The government was depriv-
ing Native Americans “the right to pass on a certain type of prop-
erty . . . to one’s heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on 
property—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the An-
glo-American legal system since feudal times.”219 Such a depriva-
tion of “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights”220 
constituted a taking.221 Interestingly, this “bundle of rights” prin-
ciple as applied in Hodel appears to be related—and perhaps the 
underlying justification—for the Penn Central factor of the “char-
acter of the government action.”222 
Yet, the property bundle undercurrent seems also closely relat-
ed to the economic Agins and Penn Central factors according to the 
Court’s reasoning in Lucas.223 As discussed earlier,224 Lucas in-
volved a law that prevented a property owner from capitalizing on 
his investment in undeveloped beachfront property. Based upon 
the finding that this law had rendered the property owner’s proper-
ty valueless,225 the Court found that a taking had occurred because 
the owner’s investment-backed expectations to build single-family 
homes on his property had been destroyed.226 Thus, the right to 
improve one’s property, as was in contention in Lucas, was closely 
related to the owner’s investment-backed expectations that he 
                                                                                                                            
217 Id. at 716. 
218 Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
219 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716 (citation omitted). 
220 Id. (citing Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 176). 
221 Id. at 718; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (finding 
a taking when the government sought to require a permanent easement for the public 
across a property owner’s private beach because the Court has “repeatedly held that, as 
to property reserved by its owner for private use, ‘the right to exclude [others is] one of 
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982))); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994). 
222 Penn Cent. Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
223 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
224 See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. 
225 The Court relied upon the state trial court’s determination that the land was 
“valueless.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006, 1009. 
226 Id. at 1027, 1031–32. 
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could derive economic benefits from building homes on his two 
lots. The deprivation of this important property right, as well as the 
deprivation of all economic use of his land, led the Court to con-
clude that a taking had occurred. From the Court’s own pen, it ap-
pears that assessing the loss of important property rights has guid-
ed Takings jurisprudence and should be considered as a guiding 
principle in the future. 
c) Deference to the Legislature 
The last underlying principle that this Article highlights is the 
self-imposed check upon the judiciary in giving deference to the 
judgment of the legislature in its exercise of police powers. This 
principle is rooted in the separation of powers ethic and recognizes 
that “the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the 
public needs to be served by social legislation . . . . The role of the 
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a 
public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”227 Because legisla-
tures are deemed to be a closer representation of the people’s will, 
the courts are called upon to exercise minimal scrutiny of the legis-
lature’s designs.228 
                                                                                                                            
227 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
228 In this way, Takings cases are peculiar among other constitutional determinations. 
The First Amendment employs complex doctrinal tests to uphold or deny 
constitutionality in protecting the freedom of speech and freedom of religion. See, e.g., 
Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Virg. Pharmacy Bd. v. Virg. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970). The 
Fourteenth Amendment also has different levels of scrutiny to determine 
constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (applying the rational basis test), with United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (applying strict scrutiny). These cases illustrate the judiciary’s check upon the 
legislature, and the power of judicial review to protect the people’s rights from a growing 
police state. Ironically, the Court does not employ such an important check upon the 
legislature in Takings cases, which protect what many founders thought to be the 
essential cornerstone of a free society: private ownership of property. See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“When this 
seemingly absolute protection [from taking private property without just compensation] is 
found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to 
extend the qualification more and more, until at last private property disappears.”). 
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This principle of deference can be traced from Mahon229 all the 
way to Kelo v. City of New London.230 While this principle continues 
to govern in determining the Public Use Inquiry,231 its influence in 
the Takings Inquiry has been slowly diminishing. For example, in 
Dolan v. City of Tigard,232 Florence Dolan sought a permit from the 
city of Tigard to expand her plumbing, expand her electrical supply 
store, and pave her parking lot.233 The City Planning Commission 
granted Dolan’s permit, but only on the condition that Dolan dedi-
cate a portion of her property to a city greenway system to assist 
with occasional flooding of a nearby creek; additionally, the Com-
mission required Dolan to dedicate a portion of her land for use as a 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway.234 The Court applied Agins to deter-
mine if the “land use regulation . . . ‘substantially advance[d] legit-
imate state interests.’”235 The Court found that the city had legit-
imate reasons for requiring the storm drainage system based on the 
concern for preventing flooding along a nearby creek. Also, the 
pathway for non-vehicular traffic was legitimate in an effort to cut 
down on vehicular traffic and make alternative transportation less 
burdensome.236 However, the governmental action must bear a 
“rough proportionality” with accomplishing these legitimate state 
interests.237 Thus, the city’s regulation for apportioning part of Do-
                                                                                                                            
229 “The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open 
to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional 
power.” Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
230 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (recognizing a “longstanding policy of deference to 
legislative judgments” in the field of “public use”). 
231 Id. 
232 512 U.S. 374 (1992). 
233 Id. at 379. 
234 Id. at 379–80. 
235 Id. at 385 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
236 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387–88. 
237 Cases like Nollan and Dolan started to give teeth to takings inquiries. The Dolan 
Court specifically recognized the similarities between the “rough proportionality” test 
and the “rational basis” test “which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court detracted from any 
theory that these were the same tests by specifically choosing different terms in order to 
dispel confusion. See id. at 391; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 
n.3 (1987) (discrediting the idea that takings analysis is the same as that of equal 
protection and due process. “[T]here is no reason to believe (and the language of our 
cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue 
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lan’s property for a greenway was not roughly proportional because 
its interest of preventing flooding with a public greenway could be 
as easily accomplished with a private greenway owned by Dolan.238 
Further, the city’s finding that building a pedestrian/bicycle path 
“could offset some of the traffic demand is a far cry from a finding 
that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of 
the traffic demand.”239 Thus, in this unique case where the burden 
was put on the government to justify its action,240 the city did not 
meet its burden of showing how its conditions for granting Dolan 
an expansion permit substantially advanced state interests. 
Dolan relied heavily on another similar case that found a gov-
ernment taking: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.241 In 
Nollan, the California Coastal Commission agreed to grant the 
Nollans’ building permit for their beachfront property on the con-
dition that they allow a public easement across their private 
beach.242 The Court acknowledged the deference paid to the legis-
lature by stating that even though its cases had not “elaborated on 
the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state 
interest’ . . . . They have made clear, however, that a broad range of 
governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these require-
ments.”243 The Commission asserted its legitimate state interests 
as “protecting the public’s ability to see the beach, assisting the 
public in overcoming the ‘psychological barrier’ to using the beach 
created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on 
the public beaches.”244 Yet, even when assuming these state inter-
ests were in fact legitimate, the Court found no logical connection, 
or “essential nexus,” between conditioning the building permit 
upon these reasons. After all, if the Nollans built a house on the 
beachfront property, this would block the public’s view of the 
                                                                                                                            
the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection 
challenges are identical.”). 
238 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392–93. 
239 Id. at 395 (citation omitted). 
240 See id. at 391 n.8 (finding that in the rare cases where “the city made an adjudicative 
decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. 
In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city” (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836)). 
241 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
242 Id. at 828. 
243 Id. at 834–35. 
244 Id. at 835. 
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beach from the street regardless of whether there was an easement 
on the beachside of the property.245 For the same reason, an ease-
ment on the beachside of the property would not help congestion at 
beaches or the so-called “psychological barrier” that existed.246 
Both Nollan and Dolan finally began to establish teeth to the Tak-
ings Inquiry after giving the legislature247 a pass for so long as to its 
occasional suspect reasoning for imposing regulations that affected 
property owners’ use of their property.248 In this way, the principle 
of paying deference to the legislature was closely tied to the judicial 
check provided by scrutinizing whether the challenged government 
action substantially advanced a legitimate state interest under the 
Agins factors. 
This check on the legislature came to an end when the Court 
abrogated the “substantially advances a legitimate state interest” 
test in Lingle.249 Lingle involved a limit in Hawaii on the rent oil 
companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service 
stations as a response to the effects of market concentration on 
gasoline prices.250 Chevron, one of the largest oil companies doing 
business in Hawaii, argued that the rent cap was a taking that re-
quired just compensation.251 In an effort to “correct course,” the 
Court revoked the “substantially advances” Agins factor because 
                                                                                                                            
245 Id. at 836–39. 
246 Id. 
247 Interestingly, however, both Nollan and Dolan factually involved scrutinizing 
adjudicative, not legislative, decisions. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 
F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). In fact, many of the 
Court’s most important Takings Clause cases involve administrative agencies or actors of 
the executive implementing the laws that the legislature has enacted. This fact does 
nothing to unwind the underlying principle above, since the Court often looks past the 
action of the executive actor to the purpose of the legislative enactment. See, e.g., Pa. Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–33 (1954); 
Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133–34, 1144. 
248 See Wilcox, supra note 114, at 484 (arguing that Nollan was a turning point for the 
Court, establishing “that land use regulations and the judgment of . . . regulators would be 
given much less judicial deference”); see also James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, 
Putting Takings Back Into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning After Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103, 105 (1996); Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, 
Exactions, and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the Court’s Fifth Amendment 
Takings Jurisprudence, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399, 406 (2001). 
249 544 U.S. 528 (2004). 
250 Id. at 533. 
251 Id. 
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the “inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of 
the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property 
rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regula-
tory burden is distributed among property owners.”252 
The Court also notably claimed that the abolition of the “sub-
stantially advances” test did not “disturb any of [its] prior hold-
ings.”253 Given the numerous applications of the Agins factors, this 
statement seems dubious; however uncertain this statement’s truth 
is, it is nonetheless outside the scope of this Article. Noteworthy is 
the Court’s claim that the “substantially advances” test was never 
really a part of the undercurrent of its cases. By abolishing this test, 
the Court essentially plucked out the teeth of the Takings Inquiry 
by eliminating a court’s ability to scrutinize the motives of legisla-
tures when enacting regulations or imposing takings. Thus, the 
Court’s acknowledgment that the “substantially advances” test 
has never dispositively decided any of its cases means that the op-
posite principle—the deference paid to legislatures—has been such 
an undercurrent to Takings Clause doctrine. 
Thus, the three underlying principles laid out in this Article not 
only connect with several of the Court’s determinations of takings 
over the years, but they also connect with each other. As stated in 
Lingle, the Penn Central factors are really based on a regulation’s 
effect on property rights (“property bundle”) and its effects on the 
burden distributed to property owners. Lastly, Lingle’s abandon-
ment of the “substantially advances” test practically gives more 
deference to legislative actions. 
B. Public Use Inquiry 
The deference paid to legislatures is most powerfully felt in the 
Court’s determination of whether a taking is for “public use.” In 
fact, the Public Use Inquiry is almost inseparable from the Court’s 
deference to the legislature. 
The Court’s most controversial Takings Clause cases have 
contested the interpretation of the term “public use.” The way the 
Takings Clause is framed, the drafters assumed that the govern-
                                                                                                                            
252 Id. at 542. 
253 Id. at 545. 
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ment taking was being made for a public use254 and that such a tak-
ing must be accompanied by just compensation. Thus, a constitu-
tional taking must pass the bar of being for public use. This bar, 
however, is inordinately low. Public Use doctrine has become so 
broad in the past century, trusting legislatures with almost a blind 
faith, that it is hard to imagine a taking that could not fit this low 
standard.255 
The Court started down this path as far back as Mahon,256 and 
further matured the doctrine in Berman v. Parker257 and Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.258 In Berman, Congress’s recently en-
acted District of Columbia Redevelopment Act was in question;259 
the Act permitted a public redevelopment agency to identify and 
                                                                                                                            
254 An odd interpretation would be one that suggested that takings for nonpublic uses 
would not be subject to just compensation. Since the type of taking is specifically qualified 
as one for public use, nonpublic use takings are not considered; thus, just compensation 
would not be a constitutional requirement. I have not seen such an interpretation 
forwarded in good conscious, wholly because such an interpretation is not intellectually or 
practically sustainable. 
255 See Madigan, supra note 5, at 181 (“In practice . . . judicial review has been so 
deferential that a finding of public use seems inevitable.” (citing Peter J. Kulick, 
Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a “Public-Private 
Taking”—A Proposal to Redefine “Public Use”, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 639, 655 
(2000))). 
256 See supra note 93. 
257 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
258 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
259 It is ironic that Berman—an opinion that showed great trust in the government’s 
motives regarding takings—was decided during a time period that the Warren Court 
handed down some of its most iconic anti-government decisions that illustrated a great 
distrust of government actors in civil rights and criminal law. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s 
Democratic Pragmatism 3–4 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 
No. 267, 2005) (“To many people, the idea of judicial deference to the elected branches 
lost much of its theoretical appeal in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Supreme Court, 
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was invalidating school segregation 
[Brown v. Bd. of Educ.], protecting freedom of speech [Brandenburg v. Ohio], striking down 
poll taxes [Harper v. Bd. of Elections], requiring a rule of one person, one vote [Reynolds v. 
Sims], and protecting accused criminals against police abuse [Miranda v. Arizona].”). 
Perhaps the Warren Court was more distrusting of the executive and its actors, but put 
more trust in legislatures that were seen as more representative of the people and more 
readily served their needs. 
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condemn blighted areas of Washington, D.C. and transfer the 
property to public agencies, redevelopment companies, individuals, 
or partnerships for redevelopment.260 This Act was passed due to 
Congress’s finding that blight was “injurious to the public health, 
safety, morals, and welfare.”261 The constitutionality of this plan 
was challenged on the basis that seizing land for the purposes of 
aesthetic beautification262 did not meet the standard of public use. 
As the petitioners argued, condemning the land and giving it to 
private organizations would not subject the land to public use, but 
rather to private ownership.263 The Court found that seizing prop-
erty to combat blight was a public use because, as Congress had 
determined, it served to remedy injurious conditions to public 
health. Thus, the Court began its semantic campaign to redefine 
the term “public use” to instead mean “public purpose”264 or 
“public benefit.”265 The Court expressed its great faith in the sanc-
tity of legislatures to exercise the state’s police power266 as “the 
main guardian of the public needs,” and that it was within the leg-
islature’s prerogative “to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced 
                                                                                                                            
260 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28, 30. 
261 Id. at 28. 
262 Berman is an important case in clearly defining the power of “States and cities [to] 
enact land use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the 
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (citing N. Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
416 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1974); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (1954); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. at 214 
(1909)). 
263 Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. 
264 “The role of the judiciary in determining whether [the eminent domain] power is 
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.” Id. at 32 (emphasis 
added) (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); United States 
ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946)). 
265 Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469, 490–91 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(using the term “public benefits” when commenting on the Court’s application of a type 
of rational-basis review to ensure that public benefits are not merely pretextual means to 
satisfy the “Public Use Clause”). 
266 “Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these are 
some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power 
to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power, and do not delimit 
it.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
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as well as carefully patrolled.”267 After all, “[t]he values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary.”268 
The Court affirmed this “public benefit” interpretation of the 
Takings Clause in Midkiff, in which the Hawaii legislature sought 
to divide lands which were held by a few dozen private landown-
ers.269 As a result of the highly concentrated land holdings, the leg-
islature found that the state’s fee simple real estate market was in-
flated, and the public welfare was being injured.270 To remedy the 
issue, the legislature encouraged those renting land to petition the 
legislature; upon such petition, the legislature would condemn the 
land from the owner, and sell it to the lessee at a fair market 
price.271 Relying greatly on Berman, the Court found that the legis-
lature’s condemnation scheme was constitutional because it was 
being used for a public use. The Court found that the “‘public use’ 
requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s po-
lice powers.”272 Thus, public use is as broad as the state’s police 
powers, which can be used to regulate nearly everything. While the 
Court noted that the public use requirement is a standard that gov-
ernments must satisfy, it made clear that this standard only re-
quires a legitimate rationale that will not be overturned “unless the 
use be palpably without reasonable foundation.”273 
Things came to a boiling point when the Court found that con-
demning private property and selling it to a private corporation 
promising to redevelop the area, provide jobs, and improve the tax 
base was within the broad understanding of “public use.”274 This 
was exactly the case in Kelo, in which the city of New London con-
                                                                                                                            
267 Id. at 33. 
268 Id. 
269 Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). The Hawaii 
legislature’s actions were based on their finding that 47% of privately owned land was held 
by 72 landowners. Further, 40% of that land was owned by only 18 landowners. Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 233–34. 
272 Id. at 240. 
273 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 
(1896)); see also id. at 240 (“deference to the legislature’s ‘public use’ determination is 
required ‘until it is shown to involve an impossibility.’” (citing Old Dominion Co. v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925))). 
274 See Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). 
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demned the home of Susette Kelo, one of a few holdout property 
owners, in order to turn it over to Pfizer Corporation to build a new 
facility, among other things.275 After exploring Berman and 
Midkiff,276 the Court realized the following: 
Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong 
theme of federalism, emphasizing the “great re-
spect” that we owe to state legislatures and state 
courts in discerning local public needs. For more 
than a century, our public use jurisprudence has 
wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scruti-
ny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the 
takings power.277 
Thus, the legislature’s plan of condemning private property for 
the purpose of “economic rejuvenation is entitled to . . . defer-
ence.”278 Of note, the dissenting Justices aptly warned that “all 
private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to 
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given 
to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more 
beneficial to the public—in the process.”279 Further, the dissenters 
argued that there was no longer any distinction between “private 
and public use of property” and that the words “for public use” 
had been practically deleted from the Takings Clause.280 
C. Just Compensation Inquiry 
In contrast to the Public Use Inquiry, the Just Compensation 
Inquiry is the least controversial and consequently the least ex-
plored part of the Takings Clause. Generally, just compensation 
means “the fair market value of the property on the date it is ap-
propriated. Under this standard, the owner is entitled to receive 
what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time 
                                                                                                                            
275 Id. at 474–75. 
276 Id. at 480–82. 
277 Id. at 482–83. 
278 Id. at 483. 
279 Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
280 Id. 
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of the taking.”281 In the case of regulatory takings, the diminution 
of the fair market value is the correct standard to apply.282 Such a 
determination can be established by expert testimony from real es-
tate appraisers at the condemnation hearing. Further, even though 
many property owners may attach a higher value to their property 
due to “relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special 
suitability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncrat-
ic) needs,” they are nonetheless not hurt on any constitutional ba-
sis when the government only pays the fair market value for a tak-
ing.283 
However, even this seemingly straightforward valuation pro-
cess can be complicated when considering temporary takings. As 
cited above,284 First English was the Court’s first foray into this 
field.285 Assuming that a taking had occurred, the Court found that 
just compensation was due even for a temporary regulatory tak-
ing.286 This logic was based on the government being “required to 
pay compensation for leasehold interests of shorter duration than 
this. The value of a leasehold interest in property for a period of 
years may be substantial, and the burden on the property owner in 
extinguishing such an interest for a period of years may be great 
indeed.”287 Later, Tahoe clarified the timing for such a leasehold 
interest, which would begin and end on the first and last day, re-
spectively, that the restrictive regulatory scheme was effective over 
the petitioning owner.288 
                                                                                                                            
281 Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511–13 
(1979)). 
282 Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463, 469 (E.D. Cal. 1984) (calculating the 
diminution in value by “compar[ing] the fair market value of the property immediately 
before the enactment of the challenged regulation with the fair market value of the 
property immediately thereafter”), aff’d, 780 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Deltona 
Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (comparing the fair market 
value of the property after the regulation was enacted with the owner’s cost basis). 
283 Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
284 See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
285 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
286 Id. at 313 (footnote omitted). 
287 Id. at 319 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379–84 (1945)). 
288 Id. at 328 (“[T]he government entity must pay just compensation for the period 
commencing on the date the regulation first effected the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date 
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IV. WHERE THE PAINT HITS THE CANVAS: ARE STREET 
ART ORDINANCES TAKINGS THAT REQUIRE JUST 
COMPENSATION? 
While the Supreme Court has not exactly established a pristine 
model of predictability in Takings Clause analysis, it is unlikely that 
a Fifth Amendment challenge to any of the street art ordinances 
around the country could withstand doctrinal scrutiny. The Tak-
ings Inquiry, as determined by where the Court currently stands, 
would almost certainly be decided in the negative because the 
street art ordinances do not squarely fit within the necessary 
bounds of either a physical taking or regulatory taking. However, a 
better case may be made when applying the underlying principles 
of such doctrines. 
As a preliminary matter, this Article assumes that property 
owners will only challenge street art ordinances with respect to 
valuable or expressive street art.289 A city’s efforts to remove gang 
graffiti, offensive tagging, or other valueless street art would not 
likely be contested by property owners who would rationally be 
concerned only with property values. Thus, in the smaller number 
of cases where street art is thought to have added value to a proper-
ty, and a city attempts to impose compliance with street art ordi-
nances, a property owner would be most likely to challenge said 
ordinances. 
A. Street Art Takings Under the Doctrinal Approach 
Courts would be hard-pressed to find that the street art ordi-
nances constituted a physical taking under current doctrine. First, 
                                                                                                                            
the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.”) (citing 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981)); see also 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 362–63 (1986). 
289 Street artists themselves would not have standing to challenge the ordinances as a 
taking because their property has not been affected. They effectively waive their rights to 
their work when they use a canvas that belongs to a property owner in which that property 
owner did not commission. Even in cases of commissioned street art, artists have very 
limited rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
See generally Amin, supra note 86, at 319–20 (even under the rights provided by VARA, in 
many instances commissioned street artists do not retain standing to challenge their art’s 
removal (discussing Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 
1949))). 
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the government is not physically taking any part of an owner’s 
property by asserting ownership of it themselves. Instead, it is as-
serting its regulatory police power to abate what it considers a pub-
lic nuisance.290 Thus, both before and after removal of the street 
art, the property owner retains title to the property. A novel argu-
ment could be made that the city’s paint itself constitutes a perma-
nent physical invasion of a portion of the property owners’ proper-
ty, evoking the per se rule of Loretto.291 This seems unlikely. Paint 
used to cover street art is perceived as one-dimensional; it does not 
take up space, add volume, or add weight. While it has never been 
tested, Loretto reads as finding takings where there is some measur-
able change, however small, in the three-dimensional realm. Paint, 
while affecting color and the way a physical wall is perceived, does 
not impose any three-dimensional burden or occupation upon the 
property owner.292 On the other hand, Causby stands for the prop-
osition that government invasions need not even be physical to 
constitute a taking.293 Mere light and sound invasions—while sci-
entifically measurable—are not three-dimensional burdens physi-
cally occupying the property owner’s land; yet, these light and 
sound invasions were still found to be a government taking worthy 
of just compensation.294 However, the Court in Causby also relied 
upon the economic effects of the invasion to reach its decision; 
thus, the closing of the owner’s chicken farm business—as well as 
the effect on the enjoyment of the property—were integral in the 
                                                                                                                            
290 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.6 (2014); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
291 Such an argument could only be made when the government uses its own resources 
to remove the street art, such as it does in Los Angeles. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 
IV, art. 14, § 49.84.7(A) (2014). In contrast, the New York law requires property owners 
themselves to remove street art using their own resources; as a result, the property owner 
in New York, using his own paint to cover street art, could not assert such a Loretto per se 
argument because it is his own paint that occupies that portion of his property, not the 
government’s paint. See also Amin, supra note 86 (arguing that forcing a property owner 
to live with a mural that he no longer wants on his property could be tantamount to a 
physical invasion because it robs him of an important property right). 
292 If street art ordinances, for example, allowed city workers to physically remove the 
portion of the wall containing the street art, in a similar way that Banksy beneficiaries do, 
such physical appropriation of that wall would constitute a taking in a way that mere paint 
never could. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
293 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1946). 
294 Id. 
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Court’s decision.295 The street art ordinances, on the other hand, 
may in fact impose a government invasion, but its economic effect 
on the property owner’s ability to do business is hardly affected at 
all; such a set of facts would not likely be enough to constitute a 
taking under the Court’s current physical occupation or invasion 
jurisprudence. However, such a challenge to a court would be an 
interesting development in Takings Clause law and would have the 
potential of changing the landscape of street art ordinances around 
the country. 
If a finding of a permanent physical taking is unlikely, a finding 
of a temporary physical taking would be even more improbable. 
Such a theory would posit that the temporary easement allowing 
city workers onto the property to remove the street art was tanta-
mount to a taking. While the city of Los Angeles reserves the right 
to enter onto a property owner’s property without prior consent,296 
such a temporary trespass297 cannot be considered a physical taking 
under Arkansas Game & Fish Commission.298 First, the extremely 
short timeframe of the suspension of the right to exclude cuts 
against finding a taking. The few hours it would take to remove the 
street art is almost inconsequential when compared to the several 
years found in most temporary takings cases.299 Second, the inva-
sion is likely foreseeable due to the existence of the ordinances 
themselves; thus, if a property owner finds himself the beneficiary 
of a work of street art, he could likely expect to be contacted by the 
proper authorities regarding its removal. Further, if he refused to 
give consent for the proper authorities to come onto the property 
to remove the street art, the temporary suspension of his right to 
exclude them would be predictable. Lastly, the severity of the inva-
sion is relatively minor. Having one or a few city workers come on 
                                                                                                                            
295 Id. at 259. 
296 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.8(A), (B) (2014). 
297 At best, property owners could construe a city’s action as a physical trespass on their 
property in order to gain access to the street art for removal. In many cases, this theory 
would be inapplicable because most street art is placed on outside walls accessible by 
public sidewalks. Thus, city workers could access the street art by the public sidewalk 
without ever trespassing on private property. 
298 133 S. Ct. 511, 522–23 (2012). 
299 See, e.g., supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
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to his property once300 to remove street art is not deleterious to the 
property owner’s ability to use or enjoy the property for any period 
of time. 
Since the street art ordinances address a property owner’s 
rights to how he uses and enjoys his property, the path of lesser re-
sistance would be to show that the enforcement of the ordinances 
constituted a regulatory taking. Asserting Lucas’s per se rule of reg-
ulatory takings would be inappropriate because the street art ordi-
nances do not deprive the property owner of all the economically 
beneficial uses of his land.301 The ordinances only target specific 
portions of the property that are not in compliance and do not pre-
vent business owners from conducting their business; neither 
would they interfere with lessor-lessee relationships while the or-
dinances are being enforced. Thus, even while either the property 
owner or city workers are removing street art on the property, 
business can go on as usual because of the noninvasive nature of 
the street art removal. 
Getting no help from the Lucas per se rule, a regulatory taking 
challenge would have to rely on the Penn Central factors.302 First, 
the nature of the government action is noninvasive and rather min-
imal, especially when comparing it to other regulatory schemes that 
have come before the Court.303 However, while previous zoning 
laws and preservation efforts have prevented development of land, 
the street art ordinances go one step further by imposing harsh civ-
il304 and criminal penalties.305 Second, the street art ordinances do 
not affect investment-backed expectations that the property owner 
                                                                                                                            
300 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522–23 (“[W]hile a single act may not 
be enough, a continuance of them in sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove 
[a taking].” (alterations in original) (quoting Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1922))). 
301 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1103, 1019 (1992); Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2004). 
302 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
303 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 18–13 (1978) 
(requiring approval from the Landmarks Preservation Commission before altering any 
building deemed to be a landmark); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52–56 (1979) 
(prohibiting the sale of eagle feathers). 
304 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.12 (2014). 
305 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00, 145.05, 145.10, and 145.60 (McKinney 2014) 
(imposing misdemeanor and felony criminal charges). 
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had when attaining title for the property. No property owner buys a 
piece of property with reasonable hopes of winning the real estate 
lottery by being gifted with a Banksy work or other valuable piece 
of art on the side of their building. Rather, the occurrences of valu-
able street art are quite random and are pleasant surprises to bene-
ficiaries.306 Third, and probably the most helpful, is the economic 
impact of the street art ordinances. As has been established, street 
art can substantially raise property values and gentrify communi-
ties.307 Nevertheless, in both Penn Central and Agins, the Court did 
not find that laws restricting certain real estate development consti-
tuted regulatory takings, even though such restrictions on devel-
opment cost the respective property owners potentially millions of 
dollars in expected revenue.308 Thus, the portion of the street art 
ordinances that gives the government the affirmative right to re-
move street art seems less injurious economically to property own-
ers than other laws that the Court rejected based on a regulatory 
takings argument. 
Neither could petitioners of the ordinances rely on Nollan or 
Dolan, two cases that gave teeth in finding regulatory takings.309 
These cases dealt with the government’s imposed requirement on 
a landowner to get building permits and the extent these require-
ments would advance a legitimate state interest. The ordinances, to 
an extent, do impose a similar type of regulatory extortion310 by re-
                                                                                                                            
306 See, e.g., Banksy Artwork Saves Youth Club as it Sells for £400k, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 27, 
2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/11059481/Banksy-artwork-
saves-youth-club-as-it-sells-for-400k.html (describing a youth club thanking Banksy for 
leaving his piece “Mobile Lovers” on their property, which allowed them to sell the piece 
to get out of debt and continue operating). The occurrences of gang graffiti, on the other 
hand, are more predictable based on the neighborhood and corresponding gang territory; 
however, property owners would not likely challenge street art ordinances in efforts to 
remove gang graffiti, but only street art they found economically beneficial. 
307 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
308 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 117; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980). 
309 See supra notes 232–48 and accompanying text. 
310 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (describing land use 
restriction as “an out-and-out plan of extortion” (citing J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 
432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as 
a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 942 n.51 (“The unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning the receipt of a public 
benefit, even a benefit to which the recipient is not entitled, upon the surrender of a 
constitutional right.” (citations omitted)). 
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quiring property owners to allow government access to property to 
remove street art; in return, the property owners avoid penalties. 
However, unlike in Nollan and Dolan, Los Angeles and other cit-
ies311 have relied on the widely asserted “Broken Windows Theo-
ry”312 to serve as their legitimate state interest of which removal of 
street art is intimately related. Thus, when painting street art with 
such a broad brush, such a regulation would not be seen as arbi-
trary,313 but would in most cases be considered as a reasonable way 
of reducing crime and gang activity. 
Another aspect of the street art ordinances are the portions that 
restrict a property owner from developing his property by commis-
sioning street art himself,314 or from displaying aerosols or markers 
in their stores in a less restrictive way.315 This is more akin to the 
traditional regulatory taking case because it would challenge a law 
that prevents property owners from affirmatively doing something 
with their property, such as selling chattels316 or expanding their 
property.317 At least one court has already contemplated and reject-
ed these types of challenges, finding that the ordinance under at-
tack was an appropriate exercise of the state’s police power and did 
not constitute a regulatory taking.318 
                                                                                                                            
311 See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, §§ 49.84.1(B)–(C) (2014); S.F., 
CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 23, §§ 1301(a), (c) (2014). 
312 See Mettler, supra note 12, at 254 n.36 (describing the Broken Windows Theory as a 
“hypothesis [that] assumes that areas rife with indicia of urban disorder—shattered 
windows or prolific graffiti, for instance—invite crime by suggesting that no one cares to 
maintain order in those areas” (citing GREGORY J. SNYDER, GRAFFITI LIVES: BEYOND THE 
TAG IN NEW YORK’S URBAN UNDERGROUND 48 (2009))). 
313 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1974) (holding that economic 
and social legislation enacted by the legislature will be upheld if it is reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective); see also Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (deferring to the legislature’s 
“public use” purpose “until it is shown to involve an impossibility” (citing Old 
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925))). 
314 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.3(B) (2014). 
315 Id. § 49.84.4(A). 
316 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 54 (1979). 
317 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 117 (1978); 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
379 (1994); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–15 (2001). 
318 See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 857 F. Supp. 1355, 1372 
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding a San Francisco ordinance requiring store owners to display 
spray paint and markers used in street art in a way that employee assistance is required to 
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B. Street Art Takings Applying Underlying Principles 
A challenge to the street art ordinances does not seem to pass 
doctrinal muster in the Takings Inquiry, but the underlying princi-
ples of such doctrines seem to be more forgiving. Thus, if street art 
ordinances are not takings under current doctrine, should they be 
due to the application of underlying principles? 
First, the application of the street art ordinances upon certain 
landowners who enjoy valuable pieces of street art on their proper-
ty does seem to be singling out certain landowners to bear costs on 
behalf of the entire community. While these ordinances potentially 
apply to everyone, they are selectively applied to property owners 
who have street art on their property. In theory, the entire commu-
nity is subject to the street art ordinances, similar to zoning ordi-
nances in Agins319 or city planning redevelopment projects in Ber-
man.320 However, unlike in those cases, not everyone in the com-
munity is practically subject to application of the street art ordi-
nances on their property. This would be similar to an ordinance 
where cities reserved the right to plug up oil wells in the rare in-
stance when a property owner found oil reserves underneath his 
property. Because of the rarity of this occurrence, most of the 
community would not realistically ever be subject to this ordi-
nance; however, the few times that a property owner struck oil, the 
ordinance would be put into effect. This is tantamount to finding a 
valuable asset on your property that was not there before, such as a 
street artist potentially raising property value with a piece of street 
art. To impose the ordinance on a few property owners who now 
enjoy higher property values in order to combat valueless street art 
would be asking that property owner to suffer a diminution of value 
to his property in order to comply with the overall public benefit of 
a uniform city plan.321 
                                                                                                                            
gain access to these products as a legitimate use of police power); see also Nat’l Paint & 
Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding Chicago 
ordinance prohibiting sale of “spray paint and jumbo indelible markers,” but noting that 
the plaintiffs—store owners that sold these items—did not pursue a claim under the 
Takings Clause, which would be a business’s remedy for “substantive protections”). 
319 Agins, 447 U.S. at 257. 
320 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–30 (1954). 
321 This is not to say that all ordinances that seek to remedy nuisances when they arise 
constitute takings. Rather, this underlying principle points towards the type of 
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Second, several sticks of an owner’s property rights bundle are 
disturbed by the street art ordinances. The ordinances strip the 
property owner’s right to exclude, which is the most important 
property right of all.322 The ordinances render a property owner 
powerless to exclude the government from trespassing on his prop-
erty when they have deemed it necessary to abate a public nui-
sance, which ironically, may actually raise his property value and 
that of nearby neighbors.323 Further, the property owner loses his 
right to dispose of his property, such as sell the property, as he sees 
fit.324 By removing the street art, the city denies the property owner 
the chance to remove the piece from his wall physically and sell it 
for profit on the open market.325 The loss of these sticks in the 
bundle of property rights is significant,326 and further support find-
ing a taking. 
The third underlying principle, courts’ deference to the legisla-
ture, is the only principle that appears to cut against finding a tak-
ing. As a common theme in Takings Clause law, courts have always 
afforded great deference to the legislature’s prerogative in exercis-
ing eminent domain or adopting regulations that affect property 
rights.327 Regarding street art ordinances, legislatures have declared 
street art to be a public nuisance primarily because it lowers prop-
erty values, incites crime, and contributes to the insecurity of the 
                                                                                                                            
government action that may constitute a taking, especially when considering the potential 
diminution of property value that would be suffered in the covering up of valuable street 
art. 
322 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 n.11 (1979). 
323 This does not ignore that in certain emergencies, government actors are allowed to 
trespass on and even damage private property without consent and without paying just 
compensation. See generally C. Wayne Owen Jr., Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the 
Fifth Amendment Mandate Compensation When Property is Damaged During the Course of 
Police Activities?, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277 (2000) (finding that current doctrine 
does not find a taking when law enforcement officers damage private property in the 
performance of their duties). However, abating nuisance is not such an emergency, and 
without an easement, consent is required to enter private property. 
324 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
325 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
326 While “the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a 
taking,” Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65, the loss of multiple sticks in the bundle, including the 
right to exclude, weighs in favor of finding a taking. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179–80. 
327 See supra Part II.A.3.c. 
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community.328 As has been examined in Part II of this Article, these 
findings by the legislatures are questionable.329 As noted above in 
Part IV, however, they are not arbitrary or impossible.330 As such, 
courts will not approach the findings of the legislatures in imposing 
such laws.331 Instead, courts are content with assuming the legisla-
ture’s findings are correct. 
C. Proposed Solutions to Street Art Takings 
The above analysis creates a conflict: while street art ordinanc-
es would not likely be deemed as a taking by courts applying mod-
ern Takings Clause doctrine, the underlying principles that gird 
those doctrines suggest that there is enough of a societal imbalance 
of harms and potential loss of property rights to justify a taking 
when valuable pieces of street art are removed. Even if the strength 
of such conflict is questioned, it seems an unjust outcome that 
property owners would be subject to a regulatory scheme that eco-
nomically lowers the value of their property, even if it may be eco-
nomically beneficial in other applications. It is true that many 
times, property owners are asked to sacrifice economic value and 
property rights for the good of the community,332 but a regulation 
that attempts coercion that can potentially result in hundred thou-
sand dollar losses seems like it should have some viable safeguards 
to protect against the occasional economic injustice and loss of im-
portant property rights. 
This naturally leads into this Article’s brief attempt to find so-
lutions that can both protect the interests of legislatures seeking to 
exercise police powers to protect public health and welfare, and the 
interests of property owners who seek to maximize their property 
values and that of the community. 
                                                                                                                            
328 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
329 See supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text. 
330 See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
331 See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
332 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government could hardly go on if, to some extent, 
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied 
limitation, and must yield to the police power.”). 
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1. Higher Judicial Scrutiny 
First, a judiciary that applied a lower standard of deference and 
a higher level of scrutiny to legislative action would raise legitimate 
questions about street art ordinances. The existing state of defer-
ence in Takings Clause law carries the risk that the taking itself, as 
well as the public benefit meant to accrue from the taking, are 
merely incidental benefits to a legislative body seeking to benefit 
itself or other private interests.333 Thus, the lack of judicial over-
sight carries the danger of approving exercises of eminent domain 
and other takings that are a mere “ruse” of the legally sufficient 
reasons given by the legislature.334 Given the heightening levels of 
corruption,335 this raises serious concerns of private interests cap-
turing the eminent domain power.336 As new research arises that 
suggests certain types of street art can have positive effects on 
communities337 and have a small impact on increasing crime,338 
perhaps such scrutiny would invalidate legislative prerogatives 
based on questionable data. 
In an era when public approval ratings of legislatures are con-
sistently at all-time lows339 and when public officials are increasing-
ly corrupt,340 are the courts not justified in applying more scrutiny 
                                                                                                                            
333 See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 
544–45 (2006) (discussing the danger of the high level of deference afforded to 
legislatures when courts take on the Public Use Inquiry). 
334 See id. at 545 (citing James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 859, 863). 
335 See infra note 340. 
336 See Cohen, supra note 333, at 547. 
337 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. See also Madigan, supra note 5, at 192 
(arguing that private capture of the eminent domain power meddles with the free market 
and diminishes economic efficiency (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: 
THEORY/APPLICATION 277 (1997))). 
338 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
339 See David M. Konisky et al., Public Approval of U.S. State Legislatures, 37 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 99, 100 (2012) (finding that across all 50 states, the average approval rating of 
citizens’ respective state legislatures was 35%). As of December 2014 and January 2015, 
Congress has an approval rating of 16%. David Sherfinski, New Congress Has Approval 
Rating of 16 Percent: Poll, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/14/new-congress-has-approval-
rating-16-percent-poll/. 
340 60% of people in the United States believe that political corruption has increased in 
the two years prior to the study’s release, with the legislature coming in as the second 
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to legislative decisions, especially decisions that may threaten one 
of the foundations of a free and democratic society?341 While the 
Court is correct that it is ill suited as an institution to take on the 
role of legislatures in the takings context,342 the judiciary has rec-
ognized the need to check the legislative branch in order to uphold 
the Constitution and repudiate injustice.343 Thus, this is not an ar-
gument for the courts to distrust legislatures by default, but rather 
to couple a lower amount of deference with a higher level of scruti-
ny in Takings Clause jurisprudence. 
Other scholars have advocated for different forms of height-
ened judicial scrutiny or otherwise higher burdens on the govern-
ment in their effort to assert eminent domain actions. Cost-benefit 
analyses,344 showings of maximization of benefit,345 showings of 
necessity,346 showings of future full public use of the condemned 
property,347 strict scrutiny analysis,348 and constitutional amend-
ments349 have all been previously suggested to add efficiency and 
fairness into Takings Clause jurisprudence. While these proposals 
all have shortcomings,350 more judicial oversight of takings is gen-
erally welcome. 
                                                                                                                            
most corrupt institution according to the poll. The study also points out that 5–10% of 
Americans admit to paying a bribe to a public official. See generally Global Corruption 
Barometer 2013: Report, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2013), available at 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2013_globalcorruptionbarometer_en/
1?e=2496456/3903358. 
341 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
342 See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
343 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
344 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
345 See Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 
EVNTL. L. 1, 45–47 (1980). 
346 See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 
203, 240 (1978). 
347 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 166–69 (1985) (proposing that eminent domain only be used when the 
benefits would accrue as “public goods” in which no one could be excluded from the 
benefit). 
348 See Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict 
Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 285 (2000). 
349 See Cohen, supra note 333, at 568. 
350 See id. at 555–58, 567–68. 
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Reinventing the wheel is outside the scope of this Article; in-
stead, this Article only seeks to recognize the potential beneficial 
application of higher judicial scrutiny when applied to street art 
ordinances. This approach of applying some level of scrutiny has 
already been applied by Justice Kennedy, making the Public Use 
Inquiry tantamount to the Rational Basis Test used in 14th 
Amendment Equal Protection analysis.351 While this is certainly a 
start, only stricter scrutiny would ensure the courts do not make 
the same mistakes of the past. 
2. Expansion of Existing Administrative Challenges 
Second, cities should expand already existing administrative 
challenges to violations of street art ordinances to accommodate 
inverse takings proceedings. This way, a property owner, at his 
own cost, could put on testimony from the community and from 
expert real estate appraisers on the increased value that certain 
pieces of street art have on his property. Such an increase in value 
should necessitate just compensation to the property owner, since 
the enforcement of street art ordinances would actually be dimin-
ishing the value of his property and the surrounding community by 
removing the valuable street art. While a challenger would be with-
in his legal rights to seek an injunction to stop government actors 
from removing the street art, and could subsequently proceed with 
an inverse condemnation action in state or federal court, streamlin-
ing this process through already existing administrative hearings 
would likely be the most efficient use of judicial resources. 
Allowing administrative challenges to city-wide regulatory aes-
thetic schemes, however, carries its own burden on the govern-
ment; it prevents the very uniformity and city planning that the leg-
                                                                                                                            
351 See Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469, 490–91 (2005) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with 
the Public Use Clause, as long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose. 
This deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic 
regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” (quotation and 
citations omitted)); see also Alan T. Ackerman, The Interplay Between the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause: Is the Supreme 
Court’s Test for “Public Use” Merely Rational Basis?, http://www.ackerman-
ackerman.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/302/2014/02/Is-the-Supreme-Court%E2%80%
99s-Test-for-%E2%80%9CPublic-Use%E2%80%9D-Merely-Rational-Basis.pdf. 
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islature intended to create. If one or two property owners are al-
lowed to hold-out, the entire scheme is put in jeopardy.352 Never-
theless, such administrative costs are worth expending to protect 
private property values. In most cases, street art will not add value 
to property, and thus property owners will be hesitant to bear the 
costs of bringing an inverse condemnation claim. Thus, frivolous 
claims will be weeded out by the costs of litigation,353 especially 
when considering the expense of hiring independent appraisers. 
These costs will increase the likelihood that only meritorious 
claims are filed and appropriately litigated with proper expert tes-
timony to establish the effects that a piece of street art has on prop-
erty values.354 
Under such an administrative system, if factual findings are 
made that the street art indeed positively affects property values, 
the government would be required to commence a formal eminent 
domain action to assert the control necessary to remove the street 
art. Thus, the government’s ability to take would not be restricted, 
but the government would be required to justly compensate the 
property owner for the tremendous diminution in value caused by 
the taking.355 Even though this system would increase government 
costs in the rare occasion that street art raised property value, re-
quiring just compensation is an important deterrent on the poten-
tially tyrannical and disparate application of street art ordinanc-
es.356 Thus, the property owner would receive the benefit of the 
                                                                                                                            
352 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–35 (1954) (reasoning that a redevelopment 
plan aimed at removing blighted areas had to be instituted by exercising eminent domain 
over entire sections of communities, not just building by building; thus, one hold-out 
owner could potentially jeopardize the entire redevelopment scheme.). 
353 See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation 
of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 557 (1986) (factoring in litigation costs as a major 
factor in deciding to litigate claims). 
354 See Henderer, supra note 114, at 409 n.2 (discussing the deterrent effect that 
litigation costs have on commencing inverse condemnation proceedings. “Due to the 
amount of time, money, and energy required to litigate a takings claim, many of the cases 
in the Takings Clause jurisprudence involve particularly valuable pieces of real property 
and parties with significant resources.”). 
355 See supra notes 110, 118, 150, and 282 and accompanying text. 
356 See James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1985) (discussing the deterrent effect that the just 
compensation requirement of the Takings Clause has on a government body when 
deciding to institute a taking). 
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increase in his property value, and the government would also be 
able to maintain its police power to institute a uniform city-
planning scheme that promotes public welfare. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to make sense of two areas of study 
that present grey areas of understanding: the street art subculture 
and how the Takings Clause governs laws that seek to counter this 
subculture. While Takings Clause doctrine may not require just 
compensation for the removal of street art, this Article argues that 
underlying principles of such doctrine point in the direction for fu-
ture change to accommodate such protection. This Article has of-
fered a unique perspective of Takings Clause doctrine and attempts 
to point out novel applications and solutions that would push 
boundaries to both protect interests of city governments in protect-
ing public welfare as well as protecting the economic rights of 
property owners seeking to maximize their property values. As the 
law continues to develop and street art continues to gain populari-
ty, it will be interesting to see the discussion around these topics 
expand in courts and future scholarship. 
